There has been a lot of interest since the global financial crisis in policies allowing emerging market economies to smooth the effects of the global financial cycle. Although the literature has focused mostly on capital controls emerging market governments have relied mostly on international reserves management. This paper discusses the role of reserves in capital flow management based on a simple welfare-based model of capital flows with international banking frictions.

There is a wide variety in the capital account policies of emerging markets and developing economies. Some countries, such as Brazil, have recently experimented with prudential controls on capital inflows, whereas others, such as China, have continued to maintain tight controls. This paper reviews the recent theoretical literature explaining the motivations behind capital account policies, and whether there is a case for international coordination in this area.

This paper presents a theory of the maturity of international sovereign debt, and derives its implications for the reform of the international financial architecture. The analysis is based on a model in which the need to roll over external debt disciplines the policies of debtor countries, but makes them vulnerable to unwarranted debt crises due to bad shocks. The paper presents a welfare analysis of several measures that have been discussed in recent debates, such as international lending-in-last-resort or the establishment of a mechanism for suspending payments on the external debt of crisis countries.

An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange-rate peg.This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation.This commitment mechanism works even though, realistically, the central bank cannot commit itself to a particular future money supply.It supports the feasibility of Svensson's Foolproof Way to escape from a liquidity trap.

How should macroprudential policy be designed when policymakers also have access to liquidity provision tools to manage crises? We show in a tractable model of systemic banking risk that there are three factors at play: first, ex post liquidity provision mitigates financial crises, and this reduces the need for macroprudential policy. In the extreme, if liquidity provision is untargeted and costless or if it completely forestalls crises by credible out-of-equilibrium lending-of-last-resort, there is no role left for macroprudential regulation. Second, however, macroprudential policy needs to consider the ex ante incentive effects of targeted liquidity provision. Third, if shadow banking reduces the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments, it is optimal to commit to less generous liquidity provision as a second-best substitute for macroprudential policy.

We show how the willingness-to-pay problem and lack of exclusivity in sovereign lending may result in an equilibrium sovereign debt structure that is excessively difficult to restructure. A bankruptcy regime for sovereigns can alleviate this inefficiency but only if it is endowed with far-reaching powers to enforce seniority and subordination clauses in debt contracts. A bankruptcy regime that makes sovereign debt easier to restructure without enforcing seniority may decrease welfare. Copyright

Standard theoretical arguments tell us that countries with relatively little capital benefit from financial integration as foreign capital flows in and speeds up the process of convergence. We show in a calibrated neoclassical model that conventionally measured welfare gains from this type of convergence appear relatively limited for the typical emerging market country. The welfare gain from switching from financial autarky to perfect capital mobility is roughly equivalent to a 1 % permanent increase in domestic consumption for the typical non-OECD country. This is negligible relative to the welfare gain from a take-off in domestic productivity of the magnitude observed in some of these countries.

This paper analyzes prudential controls on capital flows to emerging markets from the perspective of a Pigouvian tax that addresses externalities associated with the deleveraging cycle. It presents a model in which restricting capital inflows during boom times reduces the potential outflows during busts. This mitigates the feedback effects of deleveraging episodes, when tightening financial constraints on borrowers and collapsing prices for collateral assets have mutually reinforcing effects. In our model, capital controls reduce macroeconomic volatility and increase standard measures of consumer welfare.

In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure ex post. We show, however, that competition for repayment between lenders may result in a sovereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. This inefficiency may be alleviated by a suitably designed bankruptcy regime that facilitates debt restructuring.

Central banks target CPI inflation; independent central banks are concerned about their balance sheet and the level of their capital. The first fact makes it difficult for a central bank to implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, because it undermines a commitment to overshoot the inflation target. We show that the second fact provides a solution. Capital concerns provide a mechanism for an independent central bank to commit to inflate ex post. The optimal policy can take the form of a currency depreciation combined with a crawling peg, a policy advocated by Svensson as the “Foolproof Way” to escape from a liquidity trap.