I am grateful for comments received from William Brock, M. D. Godfrey, K. P. Heiss, J. Laderman, E. Marchi, C. F. Morgenstern, A. Schotter, G. Schwodiauer, G. L. Thompson, and Kan Young. Special thanks are due to Mark Perlman and an anonymous referee. All are, of course, absolved of any responsibility for any of the contents of this paper. Support of this work in part by the Office of Naval Research through a grant to New York University is gratefully acknowledged.

Introduction: scope of the paper, 165. — I. Individual demand schedules: fundamental properties, 166; alternative maximum bids, 168; reconstitution of the demand curve, 170; the reaction function, 172. — II. Collective demand schedules: additivity in closed markets, 175; more complex cases and the theory of games, 179; successive adaptation and time intervals, 182; recontracting, 185; successive adaptation in open markets, 186; further properties, non-additivity, 189. — III. Applications: elasticity of demand, 191; monopolistic discrimination and monopolistic competition, 195; the cobweb theorem, 198; the supply curve, non-additivity, 199. — Conclusions, 200.