Using comprehensive bank-loan contract information, we show that the power of a firm relative to its suppliers eases its terms of bank financing, specifically through lower loan prices and less restrictive non-price contract terms. Our results are robust to controlling for product-market competition. Supply chain power enables the firm to achieve a greater level of control over its inventory, constituting a significant portion of the reduction in its overall loan cost. We argue that it is important to consider supply-chain related issues when analyzing the external-financing capacity of firms.

Using multiple measures of attack proximity, we show that CEOs employed at firms located near terrorist attacks earn an average pay increase of 12% after the attack relative to CEOs at firms located far from attacks. CEOs at terrorist attack-proximate firms prefer cash-based compensation increases (e.g., salary and bonus) over equity-based compensation (e.g., options and stocks granted). The effect is causal and it is larger when the bargaining power of the CEO is high. Other executives and workers do not receive a terrorist attack premium.