This paper analyzes the effects of forward-looking metrics on employee decision-making. We use data from a bank that started providing branch managers with the customer lifetime value (CLV)—an estimate of the future value of the customer relationship—of mortgage applicants. The data allow us to gauge the effects of enriching the employees' information set in an environment where explicit incentives and decision rights remained unchanged. On average, customer value increased 5 percent after the metric's introduction. The metric's availability resulted in a significant shift in attention toward more profitable client segments and some improvement in cross-selling. However, the use of CLV did not negatively impact pricing or default risk, as the literature predicts. Finally, branch managers with shorter tenure displayed a stronger response, consistent with information substituting for experience.

This paper presents the results from a field experiment that examines the effects of nonfinancial performance feedback on the behavior of professionals working for an insurance repair company. We vary the frequency (weekly and monthly) and the level of detail of the feedback that the 800 professionals receive. Contrary to what we would expect if these professionals conformed to the model of the Bayesian decision maker, more (and more frequent) information does not always help improve performance. In fact, we find that professionals achieve the best outcomes when they receive detailed but infrequent (monthly) feedback. The treatment groups with frequent feedback, regardless of how detailed it is, perform no better than the control group (with monthly and aggregate information). The results are consistent with the information in the latest feedback report being most salient and professionals in the weekly treatments overweighting their most recent performance, hampering their ability to learn.