Financial regulators and investors have expressed concerns about high pay inequality within firms. Using a proprietary data set of public and private firms, this paper shows that firms with higher pay inequality—relative wage differentials between top-and bottom-level jobs—are larger and have higher valuations and stronger operating performance. Moreover, firms with higher pay inequality exhibit larger equity returns and greater earnings surprises, suggesting that pay inequality is not fully priced by the market. Our results support the notion that differences in pay inequality across firms are a reflection of differences in managerial talent.

Financial regulators and investors have expressed concerns about high pay inequality within firms. Using a proprietary data set of public and private firms, this paper shows that firms with higher pay inequality—relative wage differentials between top- and bottom-level jobs—are larger and have higher valuations and stronger operating performance. Moreover, firms with higher pay inequality exhibit larger equity returns and greater earnings surprises, suggesting that pay inequality is not fully priced by the market. Our results support the notion that differences in pay inequality across firms are a reflection of differences in managerial talent. Received March 14, 2016; editorial decision January 21, 2017 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

[When a developed-country multinational firm acquires majority control of a firm in an emerging market, there is an economically large and statistically significant increase in the acquiring firm's stock price. In 1986-2006, developed-market acquirers experienced positive and significant abnormal returns of 1.16%, on average, over a three-day event window. Positive acquirer returns and dollar value gains appear unique to emerging-market mergers and acquisitions and are not replicated when the same developed-market acquirers take over firms in developed markets. The size of the stock price increase is more pronounced (a) the weaker the contracting environment in the emerging market and (b) for industries with high asset intangibility.]

[Hedge funds have become important investors in public companies raising equity privately. Hedge funds tend to finance companies that have poor fundamentals and pronounced information asymmetries. To compensate for these shortcomings, hedge funds protect themselves by requiring substantial discounts, negotiating repricing rights, and entering into short positions of the underlying stocks. We find that companies that obtain financing from hedge funds significantly underperform companies that obtain financing from other investors during the following two years. We argue that hedge funds are investors of last resort and provide funding for companies that are otherwise constrained from raising equity capital.]

We discuss firm-level evidence based on UK data showing that within-firm pay inequality--wage differentials between top- and bottom-level jobs--increases with firm size. Moreover, within-firm pay inequality rises as firms grow larger over time. Lastly, using wage data from 15 developed countries, we document a positive association between aggregate wage inequality at the country level and growth by the largest firms in the country. We conclude that part of what may be perceived as a global trend toward more wage inequality may be driven by an increase in the size of the largest firms in the economy.

When a developed-country multinational firm acquires majority control of a firm in an emerging market, there is an economically large and statistically significant increase in the acquiring firm's stock price. In 1986–2006, developed-market acquirers experienced positive and significant abnormal returns of 1.16%, on average, over a three-day event window. Positive acquirer returns and dollar value gains appear unique to emerging-market mergers and acquisitions and are not replicated when the same developed-market acquirers take over firms in developed markets. The size of the stock price increase is more pronounced (a) the weaker the contracting environment in the emerging market and (b) for industries with high asset intangibility.

Hedge funds have become important investors in public companies raising equity privately. Hedge funds tend to finance companies that have poor fundamentals and pronounced information asymmetries. To compensate for these shortcomings, hedge funds protect themselves by requiring substantial discounts, negotiating repricing rights, and entering into short positions of the underlying stocks. We find that companies that obtain financing from hedge funds significantly underperform companies that obtain financing from other investors during the following two years. We argue that hedge funds are investors of last resort and provide funding for companies that are otherwise constrained from raising equity capital. (JELG14, G23, G32) Hedge funds have recently become an important source of funding for pub-lic companies raising equity privately. Financing young companies with severe information asymmetries is an important investment strategy for some hedge funds. Since 1995, hedge funds have participated in more than 50 % of the private placements of equity securities and have contributed