This paper studies quality upgrading to escape competition from low-wage countries and proposes a new channel that does not rely on access to new inputs or markets. Informed by Peruvian apparel firms’ response to China’s WTO accession, I introduce factor specificity in a multi-product-firm model. Profitability losses due to competition in low-quality segments induce firms to reallocate specific factors to produce high-quality varieties for high-income countries. Gains from this channel are large. Using an observed quality measure, I show that import competition substantially increases domestic firms’ exports and high-quality export shares. Firms also reduce prices, resulting in additional welfare gains.

This paper shows that self-employment shapes labor market power in low-income countries, with implications for industrial development. Using Peruvian data, we find that wage-setting power increases with employer concentration but less so where self-employment is more prevalent. A general equilibrium model shows that in oligopsonistic labor markets, self-employment raises the supply elasticity of wage labor, weakening employer market power. However, by the same mechanism, procompetitive policies aimed at expanding wage employment and reducing reliance on self-employment may unintentionally strengthen labor market power, undermining their objectives.