We extend the benchmark nonlinear deterministic volatility regression functions of Dumas et al. (1998) to provide a semi-parametric method where an enhancement of the implied parameter values is used in the parametric option pricing models. Besides volatility, skewness and kurtosis of the asset return distribution can also be enhanced. Empirical results, using closing prices of the S&P 500 index call options (in one day ahead out-of-sample pricing tests), strongly support our method that compares favorably with a model that admits stochastic volatility and random jumps. Moreover, it is found to be superior in various robustness tests. Our semi-parametric approach is an effective remedy to the curse of dimensionality presented in nonparametric estimation and its main advantage is that it delivers theoretically consistent option prices and hedging parameters. The economic significance of the approach is tested in terms of hedging, where the evaluation and estimation loss functions are aligned.

We show that firms with younger CEOs are more likely to experience stock price crashes, including crashes caused by revelation of negative news in the form of breaks in strings of consecutive earnings increases. Such strings are accompanied by large increases in CEO compensation that do not dissipate with crashes. These findings suggest that CEOs have financial incentives to hoard bad news earlier in their career, which increases future crashes. This negative impact of CEO age effect is strongest in the presence of managerial discretion. Overall, the findings highlight the importance of CEO age for firm policies and outcomes.

This study uses 462,678 monthly observations of US-listed firms for the period 1990–2018 to document a strong positive relationship between short-term changes in financial distress risk and future stock price crashes. This result is economically significant as a one interquartile increase of the main explanatory variable in any month increases the probability of a stock price crash by 8.33% relative to its mean value. The findings withstand controls for a large array of variables, firm-fixed effect estimations, and alternative definitions of distress and crash risk measures; they are also robust to a range of tests conducted to buttress against endogeneity concerns. The study conducts analyses demonstrating that the positive distress-crash risk relationship is driven by managerial opportunism that seeks to camouflage bad news that has an adverse effect on firms' economic fundamentals. Accordingly, the findings corroborate an agency theory explanation for the impact of distress risk on stock price crashes. This study offers practical insights to investors, who should be vigilant of a firm's distress risk, as sudden short-term increases underscore withheld negative information pertinent to crash risk problems.

This study presents a theoretical model that links chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence to the value loss of corporate diversification. Consistent with the model's prediction, the findings show that diversified firms run by overconfident CEOs experience value loss compared to diversified firms run by their rational counterparts. Empirically, the value loss is economically significant and ranges between 12.5% and 14.1%. In addition, the model predicts heightened corporate refocusing activity by overconfident CEOs who pursued diversified investments in the past once realized returns fail to match initial expectations. The empirical odds of corporate refocusing decisions are 67% to 98% higher when past diversifications are undertaken by overconfident rather than rational CEOs. Another prediction of the model is that overconfident CEOs exhibit preference for diversified investments, especially in the presence of ample internal funds. This prediction is also strongly supported by the data. Overall, this study proposes CEO overconfidence as a unified and consistent explanation of why firms pursue value-destructive corporate diversification policies and later adopt refocusing policies aiming to restore value.

Customer orientation reflects the organizational culture and climate that promote behaviors enabling the firm to create superior value for its customers. Using a textual measure of customer orientation (Custor) constructed from 10-K filings, we document a positive and economically significant relation between Custor and stock returns in the financial crisis of 2008–2009 and the COVID-19 pandemic. High-Custor firms outperform low-Custor firms by 1.5% per month during the financial crisis and by 4.7% per month during the COVID-19 crisis. This positive Custor-returns relation is robust to different treatments and persists after accounting for factors that contribute to corporate resilience, such as CSR activities. Our findings lend credence to the notion that customer orientation enhances a firm’s social capital, leading to improved operational performance during adverse periods, whilst our empirical evidence further supports that Custor and CSR represent distinct pathways for building trust. Consequently, firms that prioritize customer orientation experience greater resilience to negative shocks, especially during periods of low market confidence.

We estimate the term structures of risk-neutral forward variance and skewness, and examine their predictive power for equity market excess returns and variance. We use Partial Least Squares to extract a single predictive factor from each term structure that is motivated by the theoretical implications of affine no-arbitrage models. The empirical analysis shows that an increased forward variance factor, FVF (forward skewness factor, FSF) corresponds to a more negatively sloped forward variance (more U-shaped forward skewness) term structure, and significantly forecasts higher future market excess returns and variance. More importantly, FSF exhibits predictive power for market returns that is stronger than, and incremental to, that provided by FVF. However, it does not outperform FVF in terms of excess variance predictability.

We provide strong evidence that the dispersion of individual stock options trading volume across moneynesses (IDISP) contains valuable information about future stock returns. Stocks with high IDISP consistently underperform those with low IDISP by more than 1% per month. In line with the idea that IDISP reflects dispersion in investors’ beliefs, we find that the negative IDISP-return relationship is particularly pronounced around earnings announcements, in high sentiment periods and among stocks that exhibit relatively high short-selling impediments. Moreover, the IDISP effect is highly persistent and robustly distinct from the effects of a large array of previously documented cross-sectional return predictors.