The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Act”) was enacted in response to numerous corporate and accounting scandals. It aims to reinforce corporate accountability and professional responsibility in order to restore investor confidence in corporate America. This study examines the capital‐market reaction to the Act and finds a positive (negative) abnormal return at the time of several legislative events that increased (decreased) the likelihood of the passage of the Act. We interpret this finding as evidence supporting the notion that the Act is wealth‐increasing in the sense that its induced benefits significantly outweigh its imposed compliance costs. We also find that the market reaction is more positive for firms that are more compliant with the provisions of the Act prior to its enactment.

This paper examines the impact of institutional trades on volatility in international stocks across 43 countries. There is a temporary volatility spike during the trade execution period, merely reflecting the price impact costs faced by the institutions. Cross sectional regressions suggest that trade imbalances, enforcement of insider trading laws, stock prices, and an emerging market classification are positively associated with temporary volatility increases whereas the presence of market makers and better shareholders’ rights dampen such increases. In the long term, institutional trades do not destabilize markets as the levels of volatility after their trades are almost identical to their pre-decision levels.