Three channels through which the IMF rescue package may affect international lending can be distinguished: debtor-side moral hazard, creditor-side moral hazard, and debtor and creditor-side moral hazard. We show that if the rescue package fully benefits the debtor, no credit contract between him and the creditor arises. The other two kinds of moral hazard, where the creditor receives the rescue package either fully or in part, increase the scale of international lending relative to the case where no rescue package is forthcoming. The increase is larger if the creditor receives the whole rescue package than if it is shared between the creditor and the debtor. These results are based on the analysis of two sequential credit relationships, the first one between a bank and a government and the following one between the IMF and the government. Each of these credit relationships is characterized by asymmetric information and modeled by a moral hazard model. The two moral hazard models are linked by considering the different channels of the IMF rescue package.

We analyze the empirical predictions of ambiguity aversion in intertemporal heterogenous agents economies. We examine equilibria for two tract able wealth–homothetic settings of ambiguity aversion in continuous time. Each setting is motivated by a different robust control optimization problem. We show that ambiguity aversion affects optimal portfolios in a way that is similar to an increase in risk aversion. A distinct property of our second setting of ambiguity aversion is that this increase is state dependent, highly pronounced at moderate portfolio exposures and reduces equity-market participation. In general equilibrium, ambiguity aversion raises the equity premium and lowers interest rates. A distinct feature of our second setting of ambiguity aversion is that the equity premium part due to ambiguity aversion dominates when volatility is low.