We investigate the role of country characteristics on the competition-governance relation. We find that competition is associated with higher ratings in corporate governance, but only in developing countries. Further, corporate governance is associated with greater firm value, but only in less competitive industries from developed countries. For developing countries, the evidence suggests that corporate governance is valuable mostly in competitive industries. Additional tests show that corporate governance increases labor productivity and cost efficiency, mostly in less competitive industries in both developed and developing countries. Furthermore, in developing countries, corporate governance increases investment in capital, but primarily in competitive industries.

In this paper we investigate how privatization affects stock return volatility. A credible privatization builds investors’ confidence through a reduction in political risk. In particular, a privatization program that is maintained over time signals credibility, which reduces political risk and in turn volatility. We further show that privatization is associated with lower idiosyncratic volatility mainly among developed markets, while it is associated with lower systematic volatility in developing markets. Additional tests suggest that the reduction in volatility is greater when privatization sales are carried out through the stock market than through asset sales.

This paper examines the link between globalization-measured by foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) – and privatization of state-owned enterprises, in a multi-country sample that focuses on developing countries. We hypothesize that privatization has an effect on FDI/FPI as the process of fostering private sector participation is often accompanied by liberalization reforms, and by allocations of substantial shares of newly privatized firms to foreign investors. Similarly, we expect FDI/FPI to foster privatization efforts as new capital inflows, technology and managerial skills that accompany FDI/FPI make the environment more prone to competition, providing governments with incentives to privatize inefficient firms that need to be turned around. This relation is assessed in two ways, first in a dynamic panel using a generalized method of moments approach, and second through panel causality tests. We find a bi-directional positive relation between privatization proceeds and globalization, particularly in the case of FDI.