Policy Cooperation Among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable
This paper presents a simple counterexample to the belief that policy cooperation among benevolent governments is desirable. It also explains circumstances under which such counter-examples are possible and relates them to the literature on time inconsistency. Since the work of Hamada (1976), investigating the effects of increasing policy cooperation among countries has been a major topic in international economics. A standard conclusion of this work is that increasing policy cooperation among countries is desirable. In a seminal paper, Rogoff (1985) has challenged this view. Using a simple monetary model, Rogoff shows that cooperation among policy makers can lead to a lower level of welfare than noncooperation does. Rogoff's result has caused much consternation among those who advocate policy cooperation, and his work has been criticized along several dimensions. For example, some authors, including Canzoneri and Henderson (1988), have noted that a key assump-tion in Rogoff's model is that the objective function of each country's policy maker does not coincide with the objective function of its residents. Indeed, if in his model policy makers maximize the welfare of their country's residents, the counterexample is overturned