The nonlinear relationship between corporate value and managerial ownership is well documented. This has been attributed to the onset of managerial entrenchment, which results in a decrease of corporate value for increasing levels of managerial holdings. We propose a new structure for this relationship that accounts for the effect of conflicting managerial incentives, and external and internal disciplinary monitoring mechanisms. Using this specification as the basis for our analysis, we provide evidence that the managerial ownership–corporate value relationship is co-deterministic. This finding is at odds with recent work which reports that corporate value determines managerial ownership but not vice-versa.

We examine the impact of financial distress conditions at the individual firm level, the operating industry level, and economy-wide, on the stock price reaction to divestment announcements. This allows us to isolate distinct fire sale and financing theoretical explanations of asset divestments. We find that abnormal returns are significantly lower when firms divest assets during periods of industry-wide distress. During these periods the natural buyers of the divested assets are likely to have liquidity constraints, and so selling firms receive a lower price (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Fire sale effects from divestments are driven by financially constrained firms, firms selling core assets, small firms, and increase with deal size. We find some support for the financing explanation of the stock price response to divestments during periods of overlapping firm-level and economy-wide financial distress conditions, suggesting that divesting assets reduce the expected value of bankruptcy costs for selling firms under these conditions.

We demonstrate that banks play an important monitoring role in CEO succession that is not observed for other types of lenders, particularly public bondholders. There is a stronger relation between cash flow performance and forced CEO turnover for firms issuing bank debt during the year of CEO turnover than for firms not issuing bank debt, and bank debt issuance increases the likelihood of external CEO succession. The stock price reaction to CEO succession is higher when bank monitoring is prevalent. Our results are consistent with theories of relationship banking that propose a valuable monitoring role for well informed, incentivized bank lenders.