In an environment where concentrated share ownership is the norm, we ask whether Majority-of-the-Minority (MoM) votes curb controlling shareholder overreach and investment inefficiency. We consider MoM votes on controller-based related party transactions in China. Such votes give minority parties potential veto power. We report strong association between shareholder disapprovals on controller-based investment related MoM proposals and the underlying entity's investment plans. This association is robust to a battery of tests, including assessment of pre-vote consultation between minority and controlling shareholders and an exogenous regulatory shock. We also report increased likelihood of informal securities enforcements in the year following MoM shareholder disapproval.

The present research enterprise addresses the efficacy of securities enforcement in China in relation to listed firms' restatement of annual reports. We conjecture that securities enforcement induces greater care and prudence in disclosure, thus lessening the prospect of subsequent restatement. The evidence in the present inquiry strongly supports this premise. Our focus is on informal enforcements. Significantly, SOEs are more responsive than non-SOEs in arresting reporting deficiencies. In contrast to a narrative of regulatory capture, SOE decision-makers' political connections cement, rather than deter, compliance with state-based enforcements. Additionally, the two mainland exchanges impart stronger effect on disclosure quality than either central or local security bureaus. In relation to governance, independent directors exert little to no effect on year-on-year changes in restatement activities. Overall, we report that Chinese regulatory enforcement has become increasingly effective in raising disclosure standards. We surmise that learning and resource-based effects underlie this outcome.

The present study investigates the impact of a target entity’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) credentials, board diversity, and stock return synchronicity on analyst coverage decisions. Based on more than 33,000 stock recommendations on UK listed companies, we significantly deepen and extend the relevant literature (Kumar, 2010; Li et al, 2013; and Li et al., 2024) in several important ways. We find female analysts are more likely than male analysts to impound CSR information into stock coverage decisions for entities with intermediate recommendations. For firms with more extreme economic prospects. i.e., at strong buy and sell levels, the positive effect of CSR performance on female analyst coverage weakens. After controlling for the CSR characteristics of a stock, results suggest female analysts are more likely to cover firms with gender-inclusive boards. Results accord with a narrative emphasizing female analysts’ weaker access to firms with less gender-inclusive boards. Our account adds new context and application to the emerging corporate finance literature on gender-based homophily. Finally, we report limited difference in the stock return synchronicity of firms covered by male and female analysts.

China's recent promotion of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has coincided with a marked increase in the number of Chinese listed firms attracting female board members and foreign equity investors. Using Rankins' (RKS) ratings over the 2009 to 2013 period, we show that greater gender balance in top-management supports stronger CSR performance. This finding broadens gender-based accounts emphasizing social networks (Westphal and Milton, 2000), Critical Mass Theory (Kramer et al., 2006; Bear et al., 2010; and Soares et al., 2011) and team dynamics (Woolley et al., 2010; and Hoogendoorn et al., 2013). Findings also reveal stronger CSR performance in firms where a female officer is present at the CEO and/or vice-CEO level. Female leadership thus appears to be just as important as gender mix in driving CSR change. Our findings shed new light and add further dimension to the nascent literature on gender and CSR-engagement in China (Lau et al., 2016; and Liao et al., 2016). We examine whether a political-networking motivation underlies foreign investment (Du and Girma, 2010; Liu et al., 2014a; Lin et al., 2015; and Jiang and Kim, 2015). We argue that qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) deploy social-engagement in non-SOEs to build competitive advantage. But in SOEs, where strong political networks already exist, QFIIs have less incentive to boost CSR ratings. Results indicate little difference in the social ratings of QFII-invested SOEs and non-SOEs. However, CSR scores are increasing in foreign ownership levels in SOEs. By considering offshore ownership, we broaden understanding of how foreign channels influence CSR in China (Tsoi, 2010; Cheung et al., 2014a; and Lau et al., 2016). Additionally, we confirm the Barnea and Rubin (2010) contention of an inversion in social ratings at entrenched managerial ownership levels. Non-linear rating effects also emerge in relation to state ownership (Li et al., 2013). Finally, CSR performance exhibits positive (negative) relation with a listed entity's size and age (leverage and lagged return-on-equity) but virtually no connection with independent board representation.

We develop a non-linear Markov error correction approach to examine the general co-integration relation between the H- and A-prices of cross-listed Chinese stock issuers across the period January 1999 to March 2009. We unravel three important dimensions of this relation. These pertain to (i) the long-run expectation of the H- (to A-price) discount; (ii) the level of short-run co-movement in prices; and (iii) the magnitude of error corrections. Findings point to significant improvements in all three areas. Policy and corporate governance change appears to be the principal force driving the efficiency gains. Weakening informational asymmetries underlie much of the change in the markets’ relative pricing. In contrast, sentiment effects strongly underpin the contemporaneous response and error correction adjustments. Finally, the escalating Global Financial Crisis of 2008 appears to have not only bolstered the A- and H-markets’ short-term pricing dynamic but also temporarily increased the long-term H-share discount.