We show that country-level creditor rights influence dividend policies around the world by establishing the balance of power between debt and equity claimants. Creditors demand and managers consent to a more restrictive payout policy as a substitute for weak creditor rights in an effort to minimize the firm's agency costs of debt. Using a sample of 120,507 firm-years from 52 countries, we find that both the probability and amount of dividend payouts are significantly lower in countries with poor creditor rights. A reduction in the creditor rights index from its highest value to its lowest value implies a 41% reduction in the probability of paying a dividend, and a 60% reduction in dividend payout ratios. These results are robust to numerous control variables, sample variations, model specifications, and alternative hypotheses. We also show that the agency costs of debt play a more decisive role in determining dividend policies than the previously documented agency costs of equity. Overall, our findings contribute to the growing literature arguing that creditors exert significant influence over corporate decision-making outside of bankruptcy.

We examine the agency cost version of the lifecycle theory of dividends by taking advantage of cross-country variations in disclosure environments. The outcome hypothesis posits that transparent disclosure environments lead to higher dividend payouts because shareholders can more accurately measure (and therefore demand) excess cash flows. In contrast, the substitute hypothesis argues that opaque disclosure environments lead to higher payouts because managers have stronger incentives to establish their reputation for fair treatment. Our empirical results confirm both hypotheses and contribute to the literature in two primary ways. First, we confirm that the lifecycle theory of dividends explains dividend payout patterns around the world. Second, and more important, we show that the firm’s disclosure environment plays a significant role in dividend payouts through its effect on agency costs; that is, we confirm an agency cost-inclusive lifecycle theory of dividends.

This paper proposes a framework for corporate security valuation based on path-dependent, barrier option models instead of the commonly used path-independent approach. We argue that path dependency is an intrinsic and fundamental characteristic of corporate securities because equity can be knocked out whenever a legally binding barrier is breached. A direct implication of this framework is that equity will be priced as a down-and-out call option. We provide empirical validation of the barrier model by showing that implied barriers are statistically and economically significant for a large cross-section of industrial firms. Additional robustness tests confirm that barriers remain significant over a wide range of input variable estimates. And finally, we apply the barrier option framework to bankruptcy prediction and find that implied failure probabilities dominate Z-scores in most cases.

We investigate the timing of open market share repurchases and the resultant impact on firm liquidity. Using the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong's unique disclosure environment, we identify the exact implementation dates for more than five thousand equity buybacks. We find that managers exhibit substantial timing ability. Consistent with the information-asymmetry hypothesis, bid–ask spreads widen and depths narrow during repurchase periods. We decompose bid–ask spreads and show that adverse selection costs increase substantially as market participants respond to the presence of informed managerial trading. Our findings provide additional insight into how markets process information and have significant implications for corporate payout and disclosure policies.

We examine the impact of cross-listing on firm-specific information utilizing the unique features of the Chinese capital markets. By separating the trading activity of domestic Chinese investors from that of foreign non-Chinese investors, we are able to isolate each investor group's relative ability to impound firm-specific information into stock prices. We show that the cross-listed H-shares traded by foreign investors incorporate significantly more firm-specific information than their A-share counterparts traded by domestic Chinese investors. We find a similar pattern between H-shares and A-shares even after a 2007 regulatory change that allowed domestic Chinese investors to trade in the H-share market. This finding suggests that while institutional factors (e.g., stricter listing rules, stronger investor protection) can explain some of the benefits of cross-listing, foreign investors' ability to utilize firm-specific information plays a separate and distinct role in generating cross-listing benefits. The level of information improvement due to foreign investors depends on the quality of the cross-listed firm's corporate governance.

The purpose of this study is to investigate inter-temporal and cross-sectional depth patterns in an electronic, order-driven environment. Although many exchanges operate in this environment, little is known about the liquidity dynamics induced by such trading mechanisms. The findings, based on over six million observations, reveal an inverted U-shaped pattern that mirrors the commonly reported U-shaped spread pattern. An important implication is that earlier spread results understate the strength of inter-temporal liquidity variations. Cross-sectional analysis, based on adverse selection-sorted portfolios, demonstrates that corporate depth is negatively related to information asymmetry. The adverse selection impact on liquidity and cost of capital is stronger than previously believed since information costs are realized through both spreads and depths.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between investor protection and firm liquidity. We posit that less protective environments lead to wider bid‐ask spreads and thinner depths because they fail to minimize information asymmetries. The Hong Kong equity market provides a unique opportunity to compare liquidity costs across distinct investor protection environments, but still within a common trading mechanism and currency. Our empirical findings verify that firm liquidity is significantly affected by investor protection. Regression and matched‐sample results show that Hong Kong‐based equities exhibit narrower spreads and thicker depths than their China‐based counterparts.

We examine search-based peer (SBP) groups proposed by Lee, Ma, and Wang (2015) and their relationship with commonality in liquidity. Our results confirm that SBP affiliation is a significant determinant of commonality in liquidity and, unlike market- and industry-commonality, SBP-commonality has been increasing over the past 15 years. We separate retail from institutional investor queries by tracing the IP locations of Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) searches. Our results show that retail investors are responsible for roughly 85% of the EDGAR searches that generate SBP groups. Overall, our study provides new evidence of a significant demand-side commonality associated with SBP affiliations.

We show that randomly-selected Regulation SHO pilot firms respond to an increased threat of short selling by significantly improving their employee relations. Pilot firms enhance employee security to reduce the likelihood of employee-related negative publicity. The reduction of workplace concerns is most evident among pilot firms with higher degree of earnings manipulation, short interest potential, likelihood of labor disputes and employee whistle-blowing. Pilot firms experience better stock performance during the post Reg-SHO period after easing workplace concerns. Overall, our study provides novel evidence that the removal of short-selling constraints has a real effect on labor relations.