The conventional approach to estimating how fast economics converge examines the cross-economy relationship between the growth rate of per-capita output over some time period and its initial level. This approach produces consistent estimates only under highly restrictive assumptions, which are violated by the data. The paper develops an alternative approach that produces consistent estimates under weak assumptions. This approach yields estimates substantially larger than those reported in the literature and also sufficiently large to be broadly consistent with the predictions of neoclassical growth theory.

This paper derives three empirical implications of a well-specified model of consumer behavior, a model that nests both Ricardian equivalence and an alternative, non-Ricardian theory. Ricardian equivalence is then tested against this alternative. The tests reveal that Ricardian equivalence cannot be rejected.

This paper derives three empirical implications of a well-specified model of consumer behavior, a model that nests both Ricardian equivalence and an alternative, non-Ricardian theory. Ricardian equivalence is then tested against this alternative. The tests reveal that Ricardian equivalence cannot be rejected.

In October 1979, the Federal Reserve began a policy of disinflation and also stopped stabilizing interest rates. Subsequently, interest rates became much more volatile. Using a methodology advanced by Barro, this paper estimates what this change in policy did to output in the United States. The paper finds that the stagnation of the U.S. economy since 1979 stemmed almost as much from increased interest rate volatility as from reduced money growth. The paper also assesses the extent to which increased volatility of money growth has contributed to stagnation. It finds no evidence of any appreciable contribution. The paper concludes that stabilizing interest rates is probably sensible monetary policy.

In October 1979, the Federal Reserve began a policy of disinflation and also stopped stabilizing interest rates. Subsequently, interest rates became much more volatile. Using a methodology advanced by Barro, this paper estimates what this change in policy did to output in the United States. The paper finds that the stagnation of the U.S. economy since 1979 stemmed almost as much from increased interest rate volatility as from reduced money growth. The paper also assesses the extent to which increased volatility of money growth has contributed to stagnation. It finds no evidence of any appreciable contribution. The paper concludes that stabilizing interest rates is probably sensible monetary policy.