I. Introduction, 132. — II. Empirical estimation of the model, 133. — III. Regression results, 135. — IV. An alternate model, 135. — V. Conclusions, 137. — Appendix: East and West German wage data, 1965, 137.

Introduction, 445.—Summary of findings, 446.—Conclusions, 457.

Introduction, 520. — Structural bias and relative backwardness: a proposed measurement, 522. — Conclusions, 525. — Appendix, 526.

I. Introduction, 232. — II. Supply and allocation of investment funds: deposits, 233; the three main portfolios, 237; the volume of mortgage lending, 245; factors influencing the allocation of funds, 248. — III. Mortgage interest rates, 256. — IV. Comparison with yields on other investments, 261. — V. Summary and conclusions, 264.

This discussion begins with a review of the basic features of the Western neoclassical models of human capital and fertility and their counterparts that are employed in this study. This contrasts leads to the conclusion that the Western and Eastern models (in their contemporary forms) are basically identical. The agreement on the theoretical foundations of human capital analysis is bolstered by substantial agreement in the empirical results. The major comparative study of fertility and family in Eastern and Western Europe (UN 1976) failed to reveal a distinctive pattern of behavior for Eastern Europe other than its steeper decline in fertility since the mid 1950s. In general Soviet and Eastern European research (and Western studies) has yielded partial relationships similar to those found in Western countries. A simulatenous equation model of fertility female labor participation and marriage was specified and estimated using a combined time series cross section of Eastern European countries including the Soviet Union. Homogeneity tests required pooling over time and countries (except in the case of the participation equation) and the model was estimated using OLS 2SLS and Zellner-iterative techniques. The estimated equations revealed no major surprises. The labor supply of women was retarded by high fertility; higher wages drew additional women into the labor force; reductions in infant mortality lowered fertility; narrowing of the female wage differentials reduced fertility as did increases in marital instability. If there are surprises they were the positive impact of education upon fertility and the insignificant effect of female labor force participation on fertility. Simulations of the reduced form of the system revealed the direct and indirect effects of changes in exogenous variables and of shocks to intercepts. Forecasts of fertility female labor force behavior and marriage were made for the year 1990 on the basis of certain likely scenarios. All of these scenarios predicted further reductions in fertility and marriage rates and increases in female participation rates. The exercise suggests that there is no unique socialist model of population growth and labor force behavior suggesting instead that families behave similarly under radically different economic systems. There are reservations to this conclusion and the unexpected positive education effect on fertility and the insignificant female participation effect on fertility may suggest that differences in economic systems do matter in household decision making.

We survey recent research on the Soviet economy in the state, party, and military archives of the Stalin era. The archives have provided rich new evidence on the economic arrangements of a command system under a powerful dictator including Stalin's role in the making of the economic system and economic policy, Stalin's accumulation objectives and the constraints that limited his power to achieve them, the limits to administrative allocation, the information flows and incentives that governed the behavior of economic managers, the scope and significance of corruption and market-oriented behavior, and the prospects for economic reform.

[Unemployment statistics are not published by the Soviet government which claims unemployment was "liquidated" in the early 1930s. An unemployment rate for the Soviet urban population during the late 1970s is calculated from a survey of 2793 former Soviet citizens. Unemployment incidence, multiple spells, and unemployment duration by demographic characteristics are compared with U.S. patterns. Similar unemployment rates for Soviet men and women and a positive relation between education and unemployment are found.]

An unemployment rate for the urban population living in the European U.S.S.R. for the late 1970s is calculated from a survey of 2, 793 former Sovi et citizens residing in the United States. Patterns of unemployment i ncidence, frequency of multiple spells, and unemployment duration by demographic characteristics are compared with U.S. patterns. In contr ast, similar unemployment rates for Soviet men and women, and a posit ive relation between education and unemployment, are found. The Sovie t unemployment rate is low compared to Western rates for the 1970s, b ut has been matched by West Germany and Japan in high-employment year s. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.