The authors thank Kathy Nguyen for her support in conducting this experiment and for her assistance in creating the treatment messages and ensuring the experimental design was policy relevant. The authors also thank Herb Richardson for transferring the outcome data, Merlin Hanauer and Juan Jose Miranda for work to compile the data. John List, Subrendu Pattanayak, Laura Taylor, and participants at the 2009 AEA-ASSA meetings and seminars at the Georgia Water Wise Council, the Georgia Association

We formalize a research design to uncover the mechanisms underlying long-term reductions in energy consumption caused by a widely implemented nudge. We consider two channels: technology adoption and habit formation. Using data from 38 natural field experiments, we isolate the role of technology adoption by comparing treatment and control homes after the initial resident moves, which discontinues the treatment for a home. We find that fully half of energy reductions persist in the home after treatment ends and show this persistence is consonant with a technology adoption channel. The role of technology in creating persistent behaviour change has important implications for designing behavioural interventions and evaluating their long-term social impacts.

Policymakers increasingly use norm-based messages to promote conservation efforts. Despite the apparent success of such strategies, empirical analyses have thus far focused exclusively on short-run effects. From a policy perspective, however, whether and how such strategies influence behavior in the long-run is of equal interest. We partner with a metropolitan water utility to implement a natural field experiment examining the effect of such messages on longer-run patterns of water use. Empirical results are striking. While appeals to pro-social preferences affect short-run patterns of water use, only messages augmented with social comparisons have a lasting impact on water demand.

Experimental research in behavioral economics focuses on consumer behaviors. Similar experimental research on profit-maximizing producers is rare. In three field experiments involving commercial agricultural producers in the United States, we detect evidence of anchoring in competitive auctions for conservation contracts related to nutrient and pest management that were worth, on average, nearly $9,000. In these auctions, the value of the starting cost-share bid was randomized to be either 0% or 100%. When the starting value was 100%, final bids were 46% higher, on average. We find weak evidence that experience with conservation contracts may modestly attenuate the anchoring effect.