While Islamic bonds are playing an increasingly important role for companies in emerging markets, the pricing of their risk by investors remains unexplored. We examine the impact of credit ratings on the yield-at-issuance of Islamic bonds and compare it to that of conventional bonds. Analysing 1560 Islamic bonds issued in emerging markets between 1997 and 2018 and comparing them to 837 comparable conventional bonds, we find that Islamic bonds offer lower yields than conventional bonds for a given rating, even after controlling for differences between the two populations. This suggests that investors are pricing in less credit risk in Islamic bonds. We explore several explanations for this phenomenon. We find that periods of relatively lower supply in the Islamic bond market contribute to the under-pricing of risk for a given rating. Religious preferences likely drive the segmentation of the two markets in terms of risk pricing.

Banks argue that holding higher capital will have adverse implications on their lending activities and thereby on economic growth. Yet, the effect of a stronger capital base on economic growth remains largely unsettled. We argue that better capitalized banks improve financial stability conditions and, in dire times, they are able to sustain credit to the economy thereby containing adverse macroeconomic implications. Using various methods, we test for the presence and strength of a financial stability channel and a bank lending channel by drawing evidence from 47 advanced and developing countries over close to two decades. We find that higher capital ratios improve financial stability and help sustain bank lending, ultimately exerting a positive influence on economic activity. These effects on real GDP growth are economically significant, reaching up to 1¼ percentage points for each percentage point acceleration in capital. Our main results are robust to various sensitivity checks, supporting the conclusion that safer banking systems do not bridle economic activity.

In this paper we study how a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy should trade off the costs and benefits of public expenditure. We characterize and solve for Markov-perfect equilibria of the dynamic game between successive governments. The characterization consists of an inter-temporal first-order condition (a “generalized Euler equation”) for the government, and we use it both to gain insight into the nature of the equilibrium and as a basis for computations. For a calibrated economy, we find that when the only tax base available to the government is capital income—an inelastic source of funds at any point in time—the government still refrains from taxing at confiscatory rates. We also find that when the only tax base is labour income the Markov equilibrium features less public expenditure and lower tax rates than the Ramsey equilibrium.

High secrecy cultures are characterized by a preference for confidentiality and non-disclosure of information. This study documents the impact of cultural differences in secrecy on firms’ access to credit. We use data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys for a large sample of firms operating in 35 countries from 2010 to 2019. We show that firms operating in countries with higher levels of secrecy are less likely to apply for credit when they need it—they are more discouraged—and also less likely to receive credit when they do apply—they are more rationed. The underlying economic channels are greater opacity and corruption in cultures with high secrecy. The effect of cultural secrecy on credit discouragement and credit rationing is moderated by trust in banks, interpersonal trust, and firms’ financial dependence on external sources. We control for several potential alternative drivers and conduct several robustness tests. The results confirm that firms have better access to credit in cultures that promote transparency and information disclosure.

This study examines the relationship between family firms and carbon emissions using a large cross-country dataset of 6600 non-financial firms over the period 2010–2019. We find that family firms emit less carbon than non-family firms, especially after the Paris Agreement. Several factors contribute to this outcome, including governance structure, the degree of family control, R&D spending, and the issuance of green patents. Our study also shows that despite lower carbon emissions, family firms have lower environmental scores, primarily due to their reduced public commitment to emission reduction. Both environmental scores and carbon emissions increase when non-family CEOs are appointed and when family ownership decreases, indicating that agency conflicts may influence these outcomes.