I show that the corporate group structure generates tax benefits that create incentives for higher leverage. The tax benefits arise when losses on distressed subsidiaries are tax deductible for a parent firm. Higher tax rates then imply that more of these losses are borne by the government instead of the parent firm, reducing the expected costs of bankruptcy and thereby incentivizing the subsidiaries to take on higher leverage. Using data from a large sample of European multinationals, I show that this tax benefit exists on top of the trade-off theory and debt-shifting effects, and is stronger when deductions of subsidiary losses are more generous.

Empirically, the effect of corporate tax rates on leverage has been smaller than expected based on trade-off theory. In this article, I show that tax avoidance functions as a non-debt tax shield, reducing the benefits of the debt tax shield. I find that higher tax rates cause higher non-debt tax avoidance, which crowds out the debt tax shield. Moreover, I show that the strength of the relationship between debt and tax rates depends on the level of tax avoidance. A 1-standard-deviation higher tax rate implies 2.8% higher leverage for low tax avoidance firms, but has a negative effect for high tax avoidance firms.