In an incomplete continuous-time securities market with uncertainty generated by Brownian motions, we derive closed-form solutions for the equilibrium interest rate and market price of risk processes. The economy has a finite number of heterogeneous exponential utility investors, who receive partially unspanned income and can trade continuously on a finite time-interval in a money market account and a single risky security. Besides establishing the existence of an equilibrium, our main result shows that if the investors' unspanned income has stochastic countercyclical volatility, the resulting equilibrium can display both lower interest rates and higher risk premia compared to the Pareto efficient equilibrium in an otherwise identical complete market.

In an incomplete market with heterogeneous prior beliefs, we show that public information can have a substantial impact on the ex ante cost of capital, trading volume, and investor welfare. The Pareto efficient public information system is the system enjoying the maximum ex ante cost of capital and the maximum expected abnormal trading volume. Imperfect public information increases the gains-to-trade based on heterogeneously updated posterior beliefs. In an exchange economy, this leads to higher growth in the investors' certainty equivalents and, thus, a higher equilibrium interest rate, whereas the ex ante risk premium is unaffected by the informativeness of the public information system. Similar results are obtained in a production economy, but the impact on the ex ante cost of capital is dampened compared to the exchange economy due to welfare-improving reductions in real investments to smooth the investors' certainty equivalents over time.

We consider a dynamic trade-off model of a firm's capital structure with debt renegotiation. Debt holders only accept restructuring offers from equity holders backed by threats which are in the equity holders' own interest to execute. Our model shows that in a complete information model in which taxes and bankruptcy costs are the only frictions, violations of the absolute priority rule (APR) are typically optimal. The size of the bankruptcy costs and the equity holders' bargaining power affect the size of APR violations, but they have only a minor impact on the choice of capital structure.