The book begins with a quote from J.H. Dales’ Pollution, Property, and Prices, "If it is feasible to establish a market to implement a policy, no policy-maker can afford to do without one." This book provides important evidence in support of Dales’ statement. The book is a thorough examination of the first several years of the U.S. Acid Rain Program. This innovative program uses a cap-and-trade approach, rather than the traditional command-and-control approach, to reduce sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions. The book offers substantial evidence of the program’s success. The analysis is of both practical and scientific importance. From a practical viewpoint, the acid rain program is an ambitious effort to reduce a major pollutant. It is important for us to understand whether the program is successful and how it might be improved. From a scientific viewpoint, the authors’ analysis provides a framework and methodology for evaluating similar programs. There is much we can learn about effective regulation from the analysis.

Peter Cramton of University of Maryland reviews “Failure by Design: The California Energy Crisis and the Limits of Market Planning” by Georg Riling. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Develops a theoretical framework for studying designer markets as planned structures, considering what lessons can be drawn from California's energy crisis.”

Markets for Clean Air is the definitive text on the U.S. acid rain program. This innovative program uses a cap-and-trade approach, rather than the traditional command-and-control approach, to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions. The authors conclude that the program was successful in cutting the costs of SO2 emission reductions by about half, saving tens of billions of dollars. Both scholars and policy makers will have a better sense of the virtues and pitfalls of market-based regulation after reading this.

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The role of strategic delay is analyzed in an infinite-horizon alternating-offer model of bargaining. A buyer and seller are engaged in the trade of a single object. Both bargainers have private information about their own preferences and are impatient in that delaying agreement is costly. An equilibrium is constructed in which the bargainers signal the strength of their bargaining positions by delaying prior to making an offer. A bargainer expecting large gains from trade is more impatient than one expecting small gains, and hence makes concessions earlier on. Trade occurs whever gains from trade exist, but due to the private information, only after costly delay. Panmunjom, Korea—(UPI)—The American general and the North Korean general glared at each other across the table and the only sound was the wind howling across the barren hills outside their hut. Maj. Gen. James B. Knapp, negotiator for the United Nations Command (UNC), was waiting for Maj. Gen. Ri Choonsun of the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea to propose a recess. They sat there, arms folded, for 4| hours. Not a word. Finally, Gen. Ri got up, walked out and drove away. —Evening Bulletin, Philadelphia (11 April 1969)

We develop a private-information model of union contract negotiations in which disputes signal a firm's willingness to pay. Previous models have assumed that all labor disputes take the form of a strike. Yet a prominent feature of U.S. collective bargaining is the holdout: negotiations often continue without a strike after the contract has expired. Production continues with workers paid according to the expired contract. We analyze the union's decision to strike or hold out and highlight its importance to strike activity. Strikes are more likely to occur after a drop in the real wage or a decline in unemployment.

We study wage bargaining in which the union is uncertain about the firm's willingness to pay and threat payoffs vary over time. Strike payoffs change as replacement workers are hired, as strikers find temporary jobs, and as inventories or strike funds run out. We find that bargaining outcomes are substantially altered if threat payoffs vary. If dispute costs increase in the long run, then dispute durations are longer, settlement rates are lower, and wages decline more slowly during the short run (and may even increase). The settlement wage is largely determined from the long-run threat, rather than the short-run threat.

We present a bargaining model of union contract negotiations, in which the union decides between two threats: the union can strike, or it can continue to work under the expired contract. The model makes predictions about the level of dispute activity and the form disputes take. Strike incidence increases as the strike threat becomes more attractive, because of low unemployment or a real wage drop. We test these predictions by estimating logistic models of dispute incidence and dispute composition for negotiations from 1970 to 1989. We find support for the model's key predictions, but these associations are weaker after 1981.

The high-frequency trading arms race is a symptom of flawed market design. Instead of the continuous limit order book market design that is currently predominant, we argue that financial exchanges should use frequent batch auctions: uniform price double auctions conducted, for example, every tenth of a second. That is, time should be treated as discrete instead of continuous, and orders should be processed in a batch auction instead of serially. Our argument has three parts. First, we use millisecond-level direct-feed data from exchanges to document a series of stylized facts about how the continuous market works at high-frequency time horizons: (i) correlations completely break down; which (ii) leads to obvious mechanical arbitrage opportunities; and (iii) competition has not affected the size or frequency of the arbitrage opportunities, it has only raised the bar for how fast one has to be to capture them. Second, we introduce a simple theory model which is motivated by and helps explain the empirical facts. The key insight is that obvious mechanical arbitrage opportunities, like those observed in the data, are built into the market design—continuous-time serial-processing implies that even symmetrically observed public information creates arbitrage rents. These rents harm liquidity provision and induce a never-ending socially wasteful arms race for speed. Last, we show that frequent batch auctions directly address the flaws of the continuous limit order book. Discrete time reduces the value of tiny speed advantages, and the auction transforms competition on speed into competition on price. Consequently, frequent batch auctions eliminate the mechanical arbitrage rents, enhance liquidity for investors, and stop the high-frequency trading arms race.

Using Canadian data on large, private-sector contract negotiations from January, 1967, to March, 1993, we find that strikes and wages are substantially influenced by labor policy. The data indicate that conciliation policies have largely been ineffective in reducing strike costs. In contrast, general contract reopener provisions appear to make both unions and employers better off by reducing negotiation costs without systematically affecting wage settlements. Legislation banning the use of replacement workers appears to lead to significantly higher negotiation costs and redistribution of quasi-rents from employers to unions.