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Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium

Peter A. Diamond
Review of Economic Studies 1982 49(2), 217
Using a simple search technology and the Nash bargaining solution, the paper derives the steady state equilibrium negotiated wage as a function of the equilibrium unemployment and vacancy rates. For this wage, the lifetime expected present discounted value of earnings of a new worker is compared with the social marginal product of a new worker. These are not generally equal implying inefficient incentives for labour mobility.

Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium

Peter A. Diamond
Journal of Political Economy 1982 90(5), 881-894
Equilibrium is analyzed for a simple barter model with identical risk-neutral agents where trade is coordinated by a stochastic matching process. It is shown that there are multiple steady-state rational expectations equilibria, with all non-corner solution equilibria inefficient. This implies that an economy with this type of trade friction does not have a unique natural rate of unemployment.

Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium

Peter A. Diamond
Journal of Political Economy 1982 90(5), 881-894
Equilibrium is analyzed for a simple barter model with identical risk-neutral agents where trade is coordinated by a stochastic matching process. It is shown that there are multiple steady-state rational expectations equilibria, with all non-corner solution equilibria inefficient. This implies that an economy with this type of trade friction does not have a unique natural rate of unemployment.