We investigate real effects of a widespread corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting mandate. In 2014, the European Union (EU) passed Directive 2014/95 (hereafter, “CSR Directive”), mandating large listed EU firms to prepare annual nonfinancial reports beginning from fiscal year 2017 onward. We document that firms within the scope of the directive respond by increasing their CSR activities and that they start doing so before the entry‐into‐force of the directive. These real effects are concentrated in firms that are plausibly more strongly affected by the directive, that is, those with previously low levels of both CSR reporting and CSR activities. Using various alternative outcome variables (e.g., new CSR initiatives, improvements in CSR infrastructure, or firm performance), we show that these real effects reflect meaningful increases in CSR beyond firms’ potential attempts to “greenwash” CSR performance. Finally, we conduct tests that increase our confidence that the documented real effects are attributable to the CSR Directive and not general EU trends in CSR.

We examine the effect of CSR information on stakeholder decision-making, specifically on supply-chain contracting. To obtain plausibly exogenous variation in CSR information, we exploit the 2017 expansion of CSR rating coverage from Russell 1000 to Russell 2000 firms (hereafter, “treated firms”) by Thomson Reuters Asset4. Using a difference-in-differences design with the previously covered Russell 1000 supplier firms as the control group, we find a negative effect of the CSR information shock for treated suppliers with comparatively low CSR ratings. On average, these suppliers experience reductions in their number of contracts and corporate customers. In cross-sectional analyses, we document variation in our treatment effects consistent with two underlying mechanisms: (i) benchmarking of suppliers' CSR by corporate customers and (ii) CSR-related public pressure on customer-supplier contracting. Collectively, our findings provide novel evidence on the causal effect of CSR information on stakeholder decision-making.

Amendment of IAS 39 by the IASB in 2008 provided an option to reclassify investments from fair value to historical cost. We predict that too-important-to-fail (TITF) banks took less advantage of this option because the political protection they enjoyed insulated them from regulatory pressure. Banks that did not enjoy this protection had greater reason to make use of this option since doing so would protect their Tier 1 capital. As predicted, findings reveal that TITF banks made less use of the reclassification option to protect their Tier 1 capital and there is a significant moderating influence of TITF status on the incentive to reclassify investments for banks with lower regulatory capital. This finding is consistent with TITF banks placing less weight on protecting regulatory capital and thereby retaining flexibility to sell assets. Our findings provide evidence that accounting choices are affected by the importance of banks to their economies.

This study examines whether the implementation of industry-specific accounting standards helps capital market participants in making decisions about providing capital to firms. We predict and find an, on average, increase in firms’ capital growth in years following implementation of the relevant industry standard. The increase in capital growth arises primarily from equity issuances and is attributable to the implementation of the standards rather than industry-specific trends or economic shocks. We explore heterogeneity in industry standards and find more pronounced effects for (i) industry standards that reveal new information, provide explicit guidance, or increase accounting uniformity, and (ii) small firms, firms with greater information asymmetry, and firms with greater capital constraints before implementation of the standards. We also find evidence consistent with two channels explaining the documented increase in capital flows: reduction of information asymmetry and increase in financial statement comparability.

Exploiting detailed disclosures mandated by Accounting Standard Codification (ASC) 820, we provide evidence for the return relevance of Level 3 fair value remeasurements for a comprehensive sample of U.S. listed banks. We find that Level 3 remeasurements recognized in earnings are more return relevant than those recognized in other comprehensive income (OCI). Our results suggest that Level 3 remeasurements in OCI partially reflect transitory illiquidity discounts that are less relevant when banks have the ability to hold the underlying assets. The regulatory capital treatment of OCI also affects the return relevance of Level 3 remeasurements in OCI. Importantly, we find no differences in the return relevance of realized versus unrealized Level 3 remeasurements in earnings, allaying concerns that investors perceive unrealized Level 3 remeasurements of lesser quality. Overall, our findings support the usefulness of the segregated disclosures of Level 3 fair value remeasurements. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.