This paper examines differences between risk-neutral and objective probability densities of future interest rates. The identification and quantification of these differences are important when risk-neutral densities (RNDs), such as option-implied RNDs, are used as indicators of actual beliefs of investors. We employ a multi-factor essentially affine modeling framework applied to German time-series and cross-section term structure data in order to identify both the risk-neutral and the objective term structure dynamics. We find important differences between risk-neutral and objective distributions due to risk premia in bond prices. Moreover, the estimated premia vary over time in a quantitatively significant way, which implies that the differences between the objective and the risk-neutral distributions also vary over time. We therefore conclude that one should be cautious in interpreting RNDs in terms of expectations. The method used in this paper provides an alternative approach to identifying objective probabilities of future interest rates.

The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area saw credit spreads on sovereign bonds and credit default swaps (CDS) surge for a number of member states. The rise in sovereign yields was accompanied by a significant increase in sovereign CDS market activity. This pattern raised concerns that destabilising speculation via outright short-selling of CDS (so-called ‘naked CDS’) was behind the increase in bond yields. In response, policy-makers introduced a ban on naked CDS trading. We investigate the effect of the ban on the price discovery process of sovereign credit risk, contrasting results for the post-ban period with those obtained prior to the ban. We use intraday data on sovereign CDS and bonds across a number of euro area countries. Our first main finding is that the CDS market dominates the bond market in terms of price discovery. That is, CDS premia in most cases adjust quicker to reflect new information than bond spreads. This result holds also when taking into account transaction costs. Our second main finding is that the ban on short-selling did not alter price discovery dynamics or reduce the efficiency of the market. Finally, we find that prior to the ban, CDS spreads were persistently higher than bond credit spreads, even after controlling for transaction costs. This points to the presence of market frictions that limit the ability of arbitrage forces to fully close pricing gaps between the two markets. However, these pricing discrepancies were in many cases largely eliminated following the introduction of the ban.