Although public sector special audit and performance audit are frequently involved in blame, very few studies (save for Radcliffe 1997) provide detailed empirical accounts on how auditing participates in blame allocation. This study sets out to study one case of blame allocation by describing and characterizing the origins of failure and antecedents leading to the need for blame allocation, the institutional entities and arrangements that participate in the blame game, and how these entities, including the supreme audit institution, are mobilized in the processes of blame allocation. Applying a case methodology with Actor–Network Theory principles, the study extends Hood's (2002, 2007) research on blame and blame avoidance strategies by showing how a blame‐frame evaluates and allocates blame. The contribution of the paper is in four parts: first, it reveals the mechanisms that cause scapegoating of particular people and the role of auditors as experts in such mechanisms; second, it assists to develop an understanding of some factors at the core of the “accountability paradox” noted by Roberts (2009); third, it contributes to explanations as to why failing public sector reforms survive controversy and scandal since a scapegoating process can “reboot” reforms by erasing the reform's problems; and fourth, it demonstrates that an understanding of blame can be a useful addition to Actor–Network Theory.

This paper adds to the literature on the role of financial economics in accounting standard-setting by analyzing the co-performation of an economic theory – the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) – in the construction of a new approach to accounting for credit losses in financial reporting. Inspired by actor-network theory and its notions of performativity and translation, the paper draws on interview data and documents to reconstruct the process by which the devalued “incurred loss” impairment model was replaced with a more forward-looking “expected loss” approach under IFRS in response to the 2008 financial crisis. These actions comprised of a series of experiments and negotiations, including an unsuccessful effort to establish an “ideal”-type model and the failure of a joint initiative between the IASB and the FASB. Alongside extensive considerations over how to make the approach operational, the influence of the EMH regarding the relationship between loan pricing and initial expectations of credit losses is elucidated. We show how a standard-setting objective grounded in financial economics is translated through a process of approximation as it forges linkages with other matters of concern. This process sheds light on the transformations involved in finding tolerable solutions when utilizing financial economics in the setting of accounting standards.

This article examines the long-term dynamics among a best-practice risk management framework, risk management technologies and the translation of uncertainties into risks by using a longitudinal case study of a large mega-project. We show that the framework and technologies through the visual power of inscriptions and the purifying work of risk consultants as experts establish the boundaries of the forms of uncertainties that are accepted and included as risks. We term the accepted and included risks ‘pure risks’ and the risks excluded after disagreement ‘impure risks’. We also show that the construction of impure risks challenges the predictions of the framework causing a false sense of security for the project objectives, and that the continuous readjustment of technologies, in particular, is necessary to ensure the long-term realisation of these predictions. Finally, this article contributes to the literature on performativity by showing how technologies serve as buffers to shield failing economic frameworks against criticism.