We examine how financial technology affects households in terms of personal bankruptcy by leveraging exogenous variation in marketplace credit supply to Connecticut and New York residents. We document a persistent rise in bankruptcies in the affected states following sharp decreases in marketplace lending, particularly among low-income households and in areas where marketplace loans for financing medical bills are severely rationed. Borrowers’ indebtedness or local economic conditions do not explain the results. The supply of other consumer credit by banks and finance companies remains unaffected, suggesting that the observed increase in bankruptcies arises principally from reversing access to marketplace credit.

We examine global bank lending during geopolitical conflicts. Exploiting Russia’s 2014 countersanctions on the European agricultural industry, we analyze global banks’ syndicated lending to affected firms. We document a significant increase in credit supply to the sanctioned industry, accompanied by a significant increase in the shares of loans with lower spreads and longer maturities. The expansion of credit is not driven by incumbent banks alone. Instead, banks with little prior exposure to agriculture—particularly foreign banks headquartered in alternative export destinations where European firms are likely to redirect trade—account for a considerable proportion of the increased lending. This finding suggests banks actively rebalance their loan portfolio and strategic positioning in response to shifting trade flows. Our findings highlight the role of banks as intermediaries that adjust credit allocation across sectors during geopolitical disruptions, thereby cushioning targeted industries and facilitating their transition toward new markets.

We examine the role of private unlimited deposit insurance as a complement to federal deposit insurance for deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard during a crisis. We find that banks whose deposits are federally and privately fully insured obtain more deposits and expand lending, in contrast to banks whose deposits are only federally insured. We also document that privately insured banks remain prudent in the loan origination process during the subprime crisis. Our results offer novel insights into depositor and bank behavior in the presence of multiple deposit insurance schemes with differential design features. They also illustrate how private sector solutions incentivize prudent bank behavior to strengthen the financial safety net.

We present a novel way to examine macro-financial linkages by focusing on the real effects of bank supervisors’ enforcement actions. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in supervisory monitoring intensity, we show that enforcement actions in single-market banks trigger temporarily large adverse effects for the macroeconomy by reducing personal income growth, the number of establishments, and increasing unemployment. These effects are related to contractions in bank lending and liquidity creation, and are more pronounced when we consider enforcement actions on both single-market and multi-market banks, and in counties with fewer banks and greater external financial dependence.

We exploit exogenous legislative changes that alter the priority structure of different classes of debt to study how debtholder monitoring incentives affect bank earnings opacity. We present novel evidence that exposing nondepositors to greater losses in bankruptcy reduces earnings opacity, especially for banks with larger shares of nondeposit funding, listed banks, and independent banks. The reduction in earnings opacity is driven by a lower propensity to overstate earnings and is more pronounced among larger banks and in banks with more real estate loan exposure. Our findings highlight the importance of creditors’ monitoring incentives in improving the quality of information disclosure.

We examine how debt priority structure affects bank funding costs and soundness. Leveraging an unexplored natural experiment that changes the priority of claims on banks’ assets, we document asymmetric effects that are consistent with changes in monitoring intensity by various creditors depending on whether creditors move up or down the priority ladder. The enactment of depositor preference laws that confer priority on depositors reduces deposit rates but increases nondeposit rates. Importantly, subordinating nondepositor claims reduces bank risk-taking, consistent with market discipline. This insight highlights a role for debt priority structure in the regulatory framework. Received September 1, 2016; editorial decision August 31, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.