This study examines how options trading influences brand development strategies by encouraging managerial risk-taking. We find that firms with higher levels of options trading tend to introduce more new trademarks, which exhibit lower citation rates from subsequent trademarks. These firms favor brand creation over extension, leading to increased brand riskiness, as evidenced by greater trademark diversity. Potential channels for these effects include increased institutional ownership by transient investors and enhanced managerial hedging opportunities. These effects are more pronounced in firms with weaker governance, managers with higher pay-risk sensitivity, younger managerial teams, and intense competition. Additionally, we observe a negative relation between unrelated brand diversification, driven by options trading, and firm value. Our findings support the notion that active options markets incentivize managers to pursue riskier brand strategies.

We introduce a test to assess mutual funds’ “conditional” performance that is based on updated information and corrects data snooping bias. Our method, named the functional false discovery rate “plus” ( $ fFDR^+ $ ), incorporates fund characteristics in estimating fund performance free of data snooping bias. Simulations suggest that the $ fFDR^+ $ controls well the ratio of false discoveries and gains considerable power over prior methods that do not account for extra information. Portfolios of funds selected by the $ fFDR^+ $ outperform other tests not accounting for information updating, highlighting the importance of evaluating mutual funds from a conditional perspective.

The 2008 Apex Oil court decision reduced the circumstances under which specific environmental cleanup obligations were dischargeable in Chapter 11, potentially affecting the securities prices, credit conditions, and pollution practices of corporations not in Chapter 11. We discover that among financially stressed firms with those specific environmental liabilities, bond and stock prices dropped after Apex. Moreover, those firms (1) experienced a tightening of credit conditions (e.g., paying higher risk premia on debts and receiving lower bond ratings), (2) intensified pollution prevention activities, and (3) reduced the emissions of pollutants causing environmental damages no longer dischargeable in Chapter 11. These findings hold among firms nationwide, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit court, which issued the Apex decision, suggesting that Apex had a nationwide impact.

We document significant increases in the suspension of ongoing drug projects following the passage of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), which mandates that pharmaceutical companies publicly disclose detailed clinical study results. Our results suggest a causal interpretation through difference-in-differences analyses that exploit variations in pre-FDAAA information environments. We also show evidence that fewer new projects are initiated after the FDAAA. Drug developers’ learning from peer failures is the primary mechanism, further amplified by financial constraints. We also examine the consequences of enhanced information disclosure, including changes in firm investment efficiency, drug quality, and disease morbidity.

Firms become more efficient at innovation activities when they face pressure to meet earnings per share (EPS) targets using stock repurchases. Using a regression-discontinuity framework, we find that incentives to engage in “EPS-motivated buybacks” are followed by more citations and higher values for firms’ new patents. We trace these effects to improved allocation of R&D resources and a greater focus on novel innovation. The positive effects are concentrated among ex ante “innovation-efficient” firms that achieve better patenting outcomes after reorganizing (but not cutting) their R&D investments. Our findings illustrate that short-term earnings pressure can act through a free cash flow channel that motivates more efficient spending.