[Using a unique dataset of trades and limit orders for S&P 500 futures, we decompose the aggregate risk into a component driven by the impact of net market orders and a component unrelated to net orders. The first component—flow-driven risk—is large, accounting for approximately 50% of market variance, and it is not transient. This risk represents the joint effect of net trade demand and the price impact of that demand—i.e., illiquidity. We find that flows are largely unpredictable, and lagged flows have no price impact. Flow-driven risk is time varying because price impact is highly variable. Illiquidity rises with market volatility, but not with flow uncertainty. Net selling increases illiquidity, which amplifies downside flow-driven risk. The findings are consistent with flow-driven shocks resulting from fluctuations in aggregate risk-bearing capacity. Under this interpretation, investors with constant risk tolerance should trade against such shocks (i.e., "supply liquidity") to achieve substantial utility gains. Quantitatively accounting for the scale of flow-driven risk poses a major challenge for asset pricing theory.]

[Does the mutual fund industry lose its best managers to hedge funds? We find that mutual funds are able to retain managers with good performance in the face of competition from a growing hedge fund industry. On the other hand, poor performers are more likely to leave the mutual fund industry. A small fraction of these poor performers find jobs with smaller and younger hedge fund companies, especially when the hedge fund industry is growing rapidly. Analogously, a small fraction of the better-performing mutual fund managers are retained by allowing them to manage a hedge fund side-by-side.]

Margin capacity, defined as the aggregate excess debt capacity of investors buying securities on margin, strongly predicts (i) lower S&P 500 returns, (ii) lower growth in aggregate earnings, dividends, employment, and overall economic activity, (iii) higher macro, financial, and policy uncertainty, (iv) lower interest rates, (v) tighter lending standards by banks, and (vi) lower intermediary equity capital. High margin capacity is a precursor, not a response, to borrowing and intermediary constraints and higher volatility. It typically arises when levered investors with profitable past positions limit their leverage. We interpret that it reflects informed investors’ conservatism ahead of bad times.

Using a unique dataset of trades and limit orders for S&P 500 futures, we decompose the aggregate risk into a component driven by the impact of net market orders and a component unrelated to net orders. The first component—flow-driven risk—is large, accounting for approximately 50% of market variance, and it is not transient. This risk represents the joint effect of net trade demand and the price impact of that demand—i.e., illiquidity. We find that flows are largely unpredictable, and lagged flows have no price impact. Flow-driven risk is time varying because price impact is highly variable. Illiquidity rises with market volatility, but not with flow uncertainty. Net selling increases illiquidity, which amplifies downside flow-driven risk. The findings are consistent with flow-driven shocks resulting from fluctuations in aggregate risk-bearing capacity. Under this interpretation, investors with constant risk tolerance should trade against such shocks (i.e., “supply liquidity”) to achieve substantial utility gains. Quantitatively accounting for the scale of flow-driven risk poses a major challenge for asset pricing theory.

Using a comprehensive dataset of orders and trades in the Indian government bond market, this study presents new evidence on the effect of funding liquidity on market liquidity. We find no evidence that lower short-term interest rates – the key instruments of monetary policy – boost market liquidity. However, consistent with models that stress the role of intermediary capital, we find that market liquidity measures have a strong, positive association with short-term borrowing by primary dealers. We provide additional evidence linking these firms’ borrowing to their balance sheet strength and secondary market participation. The results suggest that localized funding conditions specific to marginal suppliers of intermediation services are more important for market liquidity than the broader economy-wide funding environment.

We address three questions relating to the interest rate options market: What is the shape of the smile? What are the economic determinants of the shape of the smile? Do these determinants have predictive power for the future shape of the smile and vice versa? We investigate these issues using daily bid and ask prices of euro (€) interest rate caps/floors. We find a clear smile pattern in interest rate options. The shape of the smile varies over time and is affected in a dynamic manner by yield curve variables and the future uncertainty in the interest rate markets; it also has information about future aggregate default risk. Our findings are useful for the pricing, hedging and risk management of these derivatives.

Does the mutual fund industry lose its best managers to hedge funds? We find that mutual funds are able to retain managers with good performance in the face of competition from a growing hedge fund industry. On the other hand, poor performers are more likely to leave the mutual fund industry. A small fraction of these poor performers find jobs with smaller and younger hedge fund companies, especially when the hedge fund industry is growing rapidly. Analogously, a small fraction of the better-performing mutual fund managers are retained by allowing them to manage a hedge fund side-by-side.