We analyze mutual fund industry selectivity—the performance of a fund’s industry allocation relative to the market. We find that industry selection accounts for a full third of fund performance based on two-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) codes, with the remaining attributable to the performance of individual stocks relative to their own industries. More importantly, we find that industry-selection skill drives persistence in relative performance. Unlike stock-selection ability, industry selectivity is not eroded by increasing fund assets. Our results suggest that accounting for a manager’s ability to pick outperforming industries provides information beyond standard performance measures that can enhance a fund investor’s future performance.

We examine whether the recent regime of increased liquidity and trading activity is associated with attenuation of prominent equity return anomalies due to increased arbitrage. We find that the majority of the anomalies have attenuated and the average returns from a portfolio strategy based on prominent anomalies have approximately halved after decimalization. We provide evidence that hedge fund assets under management, short interest and aggregate share turnover have led to the decline in anomaly-based trading strategy profits in recent years. Overall, our work indicates that policies to stimulate liquidity and ameliorate trading costs improve capital market efficiency.

We construct a new measure of trading regularity, capturing the extent to which investors trade on a regular basis. Institutional investors that regularly trade outperform those that trade less regularly. The performance of funds that regularly trade persists for at least a year. Among those who trade most regularly, larger funds perform relatively worse, because they incur higher transaction costs associated with their larger trades. Institutions that regularly trade generate superior performance, in part, by behaving as contrarians and by trading more aggressively on information. By contrast, we find no relation between trading regularity and performance among index funds. Received November 21, 2016; editorial decision March 28, 2018 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

We estimate buy- and sell-order illiquidity measures (lambdas) for a comprehensive sample of NYSE stocks. We show that sell-order liquidity is priced more strongly than buy-order liquidity in the cross-section of equity returns. Indeed, our analysis indicates that the liquidity premium in equities emanates predominantly from the sell-order side. We also find that the average difference between sell and buy lambdas is generally positive throughout our sample period. Both buy and sell lambdas are significantly positively correlated with measures of funding liquidity such as the TED spread as well option implied volatility.

We uncover new return predictability in the cross-section of delta-hedged equity options. Expected returns to writing delta-hedged calls are negatively correlated with stock price, profit margin, and firm profitability, but positively correlated with cash holding, cash flow variance, new shares issuance, total external financing, distress risk, and dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. Our option portfolio strategies have annual Sharpe ratio above two and remain profitable after transaction costs. Their profits can be explained by two option factors, while equity risk factors have no explanatory power. We find support for several economic channels at work, yet the option return predictability remains puzzling.

Corporate bond returns exhibit predictability in a manner consistent with efficient pricing. Many equity characteristics, such as accruals, standardized unexpected earnings, and idiosyncratic volatility, do not impact bond returns. Profitability and asset growth are negatively related to corporate bond returns. Because firms that are profitable or have high asset growth (and hence more collateral) should be less risky, with lower required returns, the evidence accords with the risk–reward paradigm. Past equity returns are positively related to bond returns, indicating that equities lead bonds. Cross-sectional bond return predictors generally do not provide materially high Sharpe ratios after accounting for trading costs.