We propose a model of post‐Great Financial Crisis (GFC) money markets and monetary policy implementation. In our framework, capital regulation may deter banks from intermediating liquidity derived from holding reserves to shadow banks. Consequently, money markets can be segmented, and the scarcity of Treasury bills available to shadow banks is the main driver of short‐term spreads. In this regime, open market operations have an inverse effect on net liquidity provision when swapping ample reserves for scarce T‐bills or repos. Our model quantitatively accounts for post‐2010 time series for repo rates, T‐bill yields, and the Fed's reverse repo facility usage.

This paper studies the transmission of monetary policy to the stock market through investors’ discount factors. To isolate this channel, we investigate the effect of US monetary policy surprises on the ratio of prices of the same stock listed simultaneously in Hong Kong and Mainland China. We identify a strong discount rate channel driven exclusively by cycle-amplifying surprises, defined as rate cuts during easing cycles and surprise hikes during tightening cycles. A 100 basis point of such cycle-amplifying surprise induces a 30 basis point change in the price ratio within five days.