This paper exploits hand-collected data on illegal insider trades to provide new evidence on the ability of a host of standard measures of illiquidity to detect informed trading. Controlling for unobserved cross-sectional and time-series variation, sampling bias, and strategic timing of insider trades, I find that when information is short-lived, only absolute order imbalance and effective spread are statistically and economically robust predictors of illegal insider trading. However, when information is long-lasting, insiders strategically time their trades to avoid illiquidity, and none of the standard measures considered are reliable predictors, including bid-ask spreads, order imbalance, Kyle’s λ, and Amihud illiquidity. (JEL D53D82G12G14K42) Received: March 14, 2019; Editorial decision: February 18, 2020 by Editor Thierry Foucault.

In almost every area of empirical finance, researchers confront multiple tests. One high-profile example is the identification of outperforming investment managers, many of whom beat their benchmarks purely by luck. Multiple testing methods are designed to control for luck. Factor selection is another glaring case in which multiple tests are performed, but numerous other applications do not receive as much attention. One important example is a simple regression model testing five variables. In this case, because five variables are tried, a t-statistic of 2.0 is not enough to establish significance. Our paper provides a guide to various multiple testing methods and details a number of applications. We provide simulation evidence on the relative performance of different methods across a variety of testing environments. The goal of our paper is to provide a menu that researchers can choose from to improve inference in financial economics.

Utilizing transaction-level financial data, we explore how household consumption responded to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. As case numbers grew and cities and states enacted shelter-in-place orders, Americans began to radically alter their typical spending across a number of major categories. In the first half of March 2020, individuals increased total spending by over 40% across a wide range of categories. This was followed by a decrease in overall spending of 25%–30% during the second half of March coinciding with the disease spreading, with only food delivery and grocery spending as major exceptions to the decline. Spending responded most strongly in states with active shelter-in-place orders, though individuals in all states had sizable responses. We find few differences across individuals with differing political beliefs, but households with children or low levels of liquidity saw the largest declines in spending during the latter part of March.

No previous infectious disease outbreak, including the Spanish Flu, has affected the stock market as forcefully as the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, previous pandemics left only mild traces on the U.S. stock market. We use text-based methods to develop these points with respect to large daily stock market moves back to 1900 and with respect to overall stock market volatility back to 1985. We also evaluate potential explanations for the unprecedented stock market reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic. The evidence we amass suggests that government restrictions on commercial activity and voluntary social distancing, operating with powerful effects in a service-oriented economy, are the main reasons the U.S. stock market reacted so much more forcefully to COVID-19 than to previous pandemics in 1918–1919, 1957–1958, and 1968.

There is a maintained assumption within the accounting literature that client bankruptcies preceded by clean audit opinions (Type II going concern opinion (GCO) errors) damage an auditor's reputation. Consistent with this view, the PCAOB proposes that stakeholders may use Type II GCO errors as indicators of low audit quality. This study examines audit committee and investor responses to Type II GCO errors. I find no evidence that audit offices with Type II GCOs are more likely to be dismissed, have lower subsequent audit fees, or have a lower likelihood of being selected for new audit engagements. These findings are consistent with audit committees not using Type II GCO errors as indicators of low auditor quality. Using event study analysis, I find evidence of modest incremental negative investor responses for clients of audit offices with Type II GCO errors. However, these negative investor responses are found only during the financial crisis period of 2008–2010 and are observed only within windows of 30 days or less. Given this limited evidence that stakeholders do respond to Type II GCO errors, I examine whether stakeholders should respond to Type II GCO errors. I find that audit office Type II GCO errors are positively associated with subsequent restatements, an established measure of low audit quality. Taking the results as a whole, I do not find that audit offices incur substantial reputational costs for Type II GCO errors. However, the negative investor response and the positive association with restatements provide some evidence that Type II GCO errors may serve as indicators of low audit quality.

Analysts' price targets and recommendations contradict stock return anomaly variables. Using an index based on 125 anomalies, we find that analysts' annual stock return forecasts are 11% higher for anomaly-shorts than for anomaly-longs. Anomaly-shorts’ return forecasts are excessively optimistic, exceeding realized returns by 34%. Recommendations also tend to be more favorable for anomaly-shorts, although this result varies across anomaly types. Consistent with analysts' slowly incorporating anomaly information, anomalies forecast revisions in both price targets and recommendations. Our findings imply that investors who follow analysts' actionable information contribute to mispricing.

Prior research has examined the firm-level performance implications of “busy” boards. Firm-level analysis, however, masks important heterogeneity in the time constraints and expertise of individual busy directors. We develop and validate shareholder voting as a proxy for shareholders’ satisfaction. Our director-specific tests provide compelling evidence that the potential costs of busy directors outweigh their benefits. At the same time, we uncover new sources of heterogeneity among busy directors. For example, the downsides are more pronounced for directors who sit on boards where fiscal year ends cluster in the same month. Our analysis highlights the role of shareholder voting in board composition research.

How do alternative job opportunities affect teacher quality? We provide causal evidence on this question by exploiting business cycle conditions at career start as a source of exogenous variation in the outside options of potential teachers. Unlike prior research, we directly assess teacher quality with value-added measures of impacts on student test scores, using administrative data on over 30,000 Florida public school teachers. Consistent with a Roy model of occupational choice, teachers entering the profession during recessions are significantly more effective in raising student test scores. Results are supported by robustness tests and unlikely to be driven by differential attrition.