We propose a parsimonious, comprehensive proxy for innovations in limited arbitrage: innovations in ETFs’ premium. Consistent with a common component, we confirm limited arbitrage factors, LAFs, constructed from ETFs’ premium innovations spanning four asset classes are correlated. Further, we find that equity LAFs are negatively priced in the cross-section of stock returns. Our pricing tests also confirm that LAFs provide pricing information beyond well-known limits of arbitrage: illiquidity and idiosyncratic volatility. Overall, our findings suggest that limited arbitrage risk is priced and LAF is a relevant risk-factor.

Consistent with the predictions of Brennan and Thakor's (1990) model of shareholder preferences, we find that, on average, institutional shareholders are net sellers during share repurchases. After controlling for liquidity provision and characteristics investing, we find that a one standard deviation increase in share repurchases during a given quarter is associated with a 0.11 standard deviation decrease in institutional investor demand. We estimate that 37% of the inverse relation is attributed to institutional investors executing liquidity provision strategies, 8% is explained by institutions reacting to the investment characteristics signaled by a repurchasing firm. We attribute the majority, 55%, to the information asymmetry between institutions and individual investors. This work is one of the first to exploit the SEC mandate requiring firms to report the actual number of shares they repurchase each quarter, beginning in 2004. Using actual number of shares repurchased, we find evidence of institutional investors increasing their selling as firms increase their repurchasing. This finding is robust to models of endogeneity and autocorrelation in share repurchases and institutional investor trading.

Drawing on current literature, this study develops a simple external financing model and provides international evidence of the causal effects of corporate governance improvements on trade credit. We introduce an internal governance perspective, hypothesizing that weak internal governance, which fosters managerial agency problems, allows firm managers to misuse trade credit. Specifically, poor governance may lead firms to rely on supplier financing as a substitute for traditional financing when they face financing constraints, a practice the literature argues raises concerns about shifting a firm's financial burdens onto its suppliers. Using a decade of data surrounding governance-enhancing board reforms in 38 countries, our difference-indifferences analyses strongly support these predictions. We find that strengthening board oversight via exogenous reforms reduces firms' reliance on supplier financing. Improved internal governance decreases firms' dependence on supplier financing and limits the manipulation of payables through real earnings management activities, such as inventory overproduction, which affects accounts payable. We also find that the effect of internal governance reforms is most pronounced in countries with stronger external governance mechanisms, suggesting a complementary effect. Additionally, our findings show that enhanced governance leads to better investment decisions and improved firm performance, especially for financially constrained firms and those with high agency costs.

This paper examines how environmental and social (ES) performance, proxied by related incidents, affect the managerial and analyst tones in quarterly earnings conference calls and its incremental effect on post-earnings call returns. We document that firms experiencing poor ES performance in the quarter prior to the earnings call exhibit more negative management tone after controlling for quarterly financial performance metrics. Tone difference in conference calls between managers and analysts predicts negative abnormal returns in the three-day window around the call. In the 60-day post-call period, we show that firms with poor ES performance exhibit returns negatively related to the tone difference on the conference call – low tone difference leads to return continuation and high tone difference predicts reversals for firms with positive earnings surprises. These results are consistent with an increase in information asymmetry and lower transparency for firms following poor ES performance.

Hazard stocks are the opposite of lottery stocks. We proxy hazard stocks with the minimum daily idiosyncratic return over the past month, “IMIN,” and examine the relation between hazard stocks and expected returns. The literature on lottery stocks implies that investors should discount hazard stocks. Anomalously, we find a negative relation between IMIN and future returns. Hedge portfolios that are long high IMIN stocks and short low IMIN stocks generate monthly alphas of -0.52% to -0.76%. The results are robust after controlling for numerous firm characteristics and corporate events. The hazard stock anomaly is primarily driven by limits to arbitrage and, to a lesser degree, by firm-level information uncertainty. Via the Reg SHO pilot program, we provide causal evidence that the apparent asymmetric preferences across lottery and hazard stocks are due to arbitrage asymmetry as described by Stambaugh et al. (2015). This demonstrates that asymmetric arbitrage may yield what appear to be asymmetric preferences.