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The Benefits of Privatization: Evidence from Mexico

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1999 114(4), 1193-1242
Critics of privatization argue that the increased profitability of privatized companies comes at the expense of society. Using data from 97 percent of those nonfinancial firms privatized in Mexico during the period 1983–1991, we study two channels for social losses: (1) increased prices, and (2) layoffs and lower wages. Privatization is followed by a 24-percentage-point increase in the mean ratio of operating income to sales as firms catch up with industry-matched control groups. We estimate that higher product prices explain 5 percent of that increase; transfers from laid-off workers, 31 percent; and productivity gains, the remainder.

Related Lending

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2003 118(1), 231-268 open access
In many countries, banks lend to firms controlled by the bank's owners. We examine the benefits of related lending using a newly assembled data set for Mexico. Related lending is prevalent (20 percent of commercial loans) and takes place on better terms than arm's-length lending (annual interest rates are 4 percentage points lower). Related loans are 33 percent more likely to default and, when they do, have lower recovery rates (30 percent less) than unrelated ones. The evidence for Mexico in the 1990s supports the view that in some important settings related lending is a manifestation of looting.

Courts

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2003 118(2), 453-517
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries, and is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and more corruption. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.

The Regulation of Entry

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(1), 1-37 open access
Countries differ significantly in the way in which they regulate the entry of new businesses. To meet government requirements for starting to operate a business in Austria, an entrepreneur must complete 12 procedures taking at least 154 business days and pay US$11,612 in government fees. To do the same, an entrepreneur in Bolivia needs to follow 20 different procedures, pay US$2,696 in fees to the government and wait at least 82 business days to acquire the necessary permits. In contrast, an entrepreneur in Canada can finish the process in roughly 2 days by paying US$280 in government fees and completing only 2 procedures.