We investigate ethnic minority and nonminority sell‐side analysts’ participation in public earnings conference calls. We find that minority analysts are underrepresented in conference call Q&A sessions, and minority analysts who do participate on the calls experience lower levels of prioritization than do nonminority analysts. Minority analysts’ lower participation rates are partially but not fully mediated by characteristics such as experience, work environment, and stock rating favorability. Additionally, firm and conference call fixed effects mediate approximately half the magnitude of lower minority participation rates. Extroverted minority analysts participate at higher rates, but the negative association between minority status and conference call participation is exacerbated when calls are more time constrained, when executive teams are less diverse, and when analysts are from less prestigious brokerage houses. Overall, we document the underrepresentation of minority analysts on earnings conference calls and provide evidence suggesting both analysts’ and managers’ choices influence minority analysts’ participation rates.

Securities litigation is relatively rare, but can significantly affect sued firms. We extend this research by examining the spillover effect of securities litigation on industry peers using a sample of disclosure-related litigation—distinct from events such as restatements and SEC enforcement. We find investors respond immediately as peers exhibit negative abnormal returns before and after case filings. Additionally, peers provide more voluntary earnings and sales forecasts. Notably, investors and peers respond primarily to cases that eventually settle, where litigation costs are concentrated. Further, disclosure results are concentrated in growth firms, where voluntary disclosure is most important, and in low-litigation industries, where litigation is more noteworthy. Peers also adjust attributes of mandatory disclosures: disclosures become shorter, more readable, and contain fewer litigation-related terms. These changes appear successful as peers have lower future litigation incidence. Collectively, our findings indicate securities litigation has significant effects beyond the firms that directly face litigation.