[Focusing on economic distress episodes in an industry, we estimate the effect of conglomeration on resource allocation. Distressed segments have higher sales growth, higher cash flow, and higher expenditure on research and development than single-segment firms. This is especially true for segments with high past performance, for unrated firms, and in competitive industries. Single-segment firms increase cash holding, and the diversification discount reduces during industry distress. Firms with high past performance acquire their industry counterparts, and firms with low past performance exit the distressed industry. Industries more prone to distress have greater conglomeration. Overall, conglomeration enables segments to avoid financial constraints during industry distress.]

Focusing on economic distress episodes in an industry, we estimate the effect of conglomeration on resource allocation. Distressed segments have higher sales growth, higher cash flow, and higher expenditure on research and development than single-segment firms. This is especially true for segments with high past performance, for unrated firms, and in competitive industries. Single-segment firms increase cash holding, and the diversification discount reduces during industry distress. Firms with high past performance acquire their industry counterparts, and firms with low past performance exit the distressed industry. Industries more prone to distress have greater conglomeration. Overall, conglomeration enables segments to avoid financial constraints during industry distress. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Abstract Using a large loan sample from 1990 to 2006, we examine why firms form new banking relationships. Small public firms that do not have existing relationships with large banks are more likely to form new banking relationships. On average, firms obtain higher loan amounts when they form new banking relationships, while small firms also experience an increase in sales growth, capital expenditure, leverage, analyst coverage, and public debt issuance subsequently. Our findings suggest that firms form new banking relationships to expand their access to credit and capital market services, and highlight an important cost of exclusive banking relationships.

ABSTRACT We investigate the effect of poor performance on financial intermediary reputation by estimating the effect of large‐scale bankruptcies among a lead arranger's borrowers on its subsequent syndication activity. Consistent with reputation damage, such lead arrangers retain larger fractions of the loans they syndicate, are less likely to syndicate loans, and are less likely to attract participant lenders. The consequences are more severe when borrower bankruptcies suggest inadequate screening or monitoring by the lead arranger. However, the effect of borrower bankruptcies on syndication activity is not present among dominant lead arrangers, and is weak in years in which many lead arrangers experience borrower bankruptcies.