This paper studies the effect of interest rates on investment in an environment where firms make irreversible investments with uncertain pay-offs. In this setting, changes in the interest rate affect both the cost of capital and the cost of delaying investment to acquire information. These two forces combine to generate an aggregate investment demand curve that is a backward-bending function of the interest rate. At low rates, increasing the interest rate raises investment by increasing the cost of delay. Copyright 2007, Wiley-Blackwell.

How can price elasticities be identified when agents face optimization frictions such as adjustment costs or inattention? I derive bounds on structural price elasticities that are a function of the observed effect of a price change on demand, the size of the price change, and the degree of frictions. The degree of frictions is measured by the utility losses agents tolerate to deviate from the frictionless optimum. The bounds imply that frictions affect intensive margin elasticities much more than extensive margin elasticities. I apply these bounds to the literature on labor supply. The utility costs of ignoring the tax changes used to identify intensive margin labor supply elasticities are typically less than 1% of earnings. As a result, small frictions can explain the differences between micro and macro elasticities, extensive and intensive margin elasticities, and other disparate findings. Pooling estimates from existing studies, I estimate a Hicksian labor supply elasticity of 0.33 on the intensive margin and 0.25 on the extensive margin after accounting for frictions.

The debate about behavioral economics–the incorporation of insights from psychology into economics–is often framed as a question about the foundational assumptions of economic models. This paper presents a more pragmatic perspective on behavioral economics that focuses on its value for improving empirical predictions and policy decisions. I discuss three ways in which behavioral economics can contribute to public policy: by offering new policy tools, improving predictions about the effects of existing policies, and generating new welfare implications. I illustrate these contributions using applications to retirement savings, labor supply, and neighborhood choice. Behavioral models provide new tools to change behaviors such as savings rates and new counterfactuals to estimate the effects of policies such as income taxation. Behavioral models also provide new prescriptions for optimal policy that can be characterized in a non-paternalistic manner using methods analogous to those in neoclassical models. Model uncertainty does not justify using the neoclassical model; instead, it can provide a new rationale for using behavioral nudges. I conclude that incorporating behavioral features to the extent they help answer core economic questions may be more productive than viewing behavioral economics as a separate subfield that challenges the assumptions of neoclassical models.

I show existing evidence on labor supply behavior places an upper bound on risk aversion in the expected utility model. I derive a formula for the coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ) in terms of the ratio of the income elasticity of labor supply to wage elasticity and degree of complementarity between consumption and labor. I bound the degree of complementarity using data on consumption choices when labor supply varies across states. Using labor supply elasticity estimates, I find a mean estimate of [Formula: see text], then show generating γ > 2 requires that wage increases cause sharper labor supply reductions.

This paper presents new evidence on why unemployment insurance (UI) benefits affect search behavior and develops a simple method of calculating the welfare gains from UI using this evidence. I show that 60 percent of the increase in unemployment durations caused by UI benefits is due to a "liquidity effect" rather than distortions on marginal incentives to search ("moral hazard") by combining two empirical strategies. First, I find that increases in benefits have much larger effects on durations for liquidity-constrained households. Second, lump-sum severance payments increase durations substantially among constrained households. I derive a formula for the optimal benefit level that depends only on the reduced-form liquidity and moral hazard elasticities. The formula implies that the optimal UI benefit level exceeds 50 percent of the wage. The "exact identification" approach to welfare analysis proposed here yields robust optimal policy results because it does not require structural estimation of primitives. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

This paper analyzes the effects of dividend taxation on corporate behavior using the large tax cut on individual dividend income enacted in 2003.Using data spanning 1980 to 2004-Q2, we document a sharp and widespread surge in dividend payments following the tax cut, along several dimensions.First, an unprecedented number of firms initiated regular dividend payments after the reform.As a result, the number of publicly traded firms paying dividends, after having declined continuously for more than two decades, began to increase precisely in 2003.Second, many firms that were already paying dividends prior to the reform raised regular dividend payments significantly.Third, special dividends also rose.All of these effects are robust to introducing controls for profits and other firm characteristics.Additional evidence for specific groups of firms suggests that the tax cut induced increases in total payout rather than substitution between dividends and repurchases.The tax response was confined to firms with lower levels of forecasted growth, consistent with an improvement in capital allocation efficiency.The response to the tax cut was strongest in firms with strong principals whose tax incentives changed (presence of large taxable institutional owners or independent directors with large share holdings), and in firms where agents had stronger incentives to respond (large executive ownership and low levels of executive stock-options outstanding).These findings show that principal-agent issues play a central role in corporate responses to taxation.

We analyze the implications of household-level adjustment costs for the dynamics of aggregate consumption. We show that an economy in which agents have “consumption commitments” is approximately equivalent to a habit formation model in which the habit stock is a weighted average of past consumption if idiosyncratic risk is large relative to aggregate risk. Consumption commitments can thus explain the empirical regularity that consumption is excessively sensitive and excessively smooth, findings that are typically attributed to habit formation. Unlike habit formation and other theories, but consistent with empirical evidence, the consumption commitments model also predicts that excess sensitivity and smoothness vanish for large shocks. These results suggest that behavior previously attributed to habit formation may be better explained by adjustment costs. We develop additional testable predictions to further distinguish the commitment and habit models and show that the two models have different welfare implications.

The Effects of the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut on Corporate Behavior: Interpreting the Evidence by Raj Chetty and Emmanuel Saez. Published in volume 96, issue 2, pages 124-129 of American Economic Review, May 2006

ABSTRACT We show that characterizing the effects of housing on portfolios requires distinguishing between the effects of home equity and mortgage debt. We isolate exogenous variation in home equity and mortgages by using differences across housing markets in house prices and housing supply elasticities as instruments. Increases in property value (holding home equity constant) reduce stockholdings, while increases in home equity wealth (holding property value constant) raise stockholdings. The stock share of liquid wealth would rise by 1 percentage point—6% of the mean stock share—if a household were to spend 10% less on its house, holding fixed wealth.

We use anonymized admissions data from several colleges linked to income tax records and SAT and ACT test scores to study the determinants and causal effects of attending Ivy-Plus colleges (Ivy League, Stanford, MIT, Duke, and Chicago). Children from families in the top 1% are more than twice as likely to attend an Ivy-Plus college as those from middle-class families with comparable SAT/ACT scores. Two-thirds of this gap is due to higher admission rates for students with comparable test scores from high-income families; the remaining third is due to differences in rates of application and matriculation. In contrast, children from high-income families have no admissions advantage at flagship public colleges. The high-income admissions advantage at Ivy-Plus colleges is driven by three factors: (i) preferences for children of alumni, (ii) weight placed on nonacademic credentials, and (iii) athletic recruitment. Using a new research design that isolates idiosyncratic variation in admissions decisions for waitlisted applicants, we show that attending an Ivy-Plus college instead of the average flagship public college increases students’ chances of reaching the top 1% of the earnings distribution by 50%, nearly doubles their chances of attending an elite graduate school, and almost triples their chances of working at a prestigious firm. The three factors that give children from high-income families an admissions advantage are uncorrelated or negatively correlated with postcollege outcomes, whereas academic credentials such as SAT/ACT scores are highly predictive of postcollege success.