We investigate the choice of organizational form for investment funds. We find that funds that hold less liquid securities with less transparent prices are more likely to be closed-end. The relation is economically meaningful as well as statistically significant. Our results are consistent with Fama and Jensen's [J. Law Econ. 26 (1983a) 327; J. Law Econ. 26 (1983b) 301] prediction that redeemable shares are not efficient when assets are relatively illiquid and asset prices are difficult to observe.

We investigate the option to invest in derivative securities using a large sample of mutual funds. We find that those funds with the greatest transaction-cost benefit tend to permit investment in derivatives, and that funds tend to permit investment only in those derivatives that offer transaction-cost benefits. Our results indicate that a fund's decision to permit investment in derivatives is driven by increased efficiency rather than advisor opportunism.

We investigate the market's reaction to original-issue deep discount (OID) bonds, which are issued at prices well below par and with coupons set below the market rate. Until July 1982 OID debt offered large tax advantages. Before that date stock-price responses to announcements of OID debt are significantly positive, in contrast to the negative, albeit insignificant, responses associated with par debt announcements. No stock-price gains are observed for OID debt issued after the tax advantages are removed. We conclude that in 1981–82 opportunities provided by financial innovation offset the negative information effects typically associated with debt-financing announcements.

Firms that made earnings-decreasing restatements over the period 1990 to 2001 lost $72 billion around restatement announcements. Forty-seven large-loss firms restating their earnings in the 1998 to 2001 period account for $66 billion of these losses. Despite very good stock performance and low book-to-market values before earnings misstatements, large-loss firms are associated with mean abnormal returns of −39% during the announcement period, and underperform matched firms by 44% during the first post-restatement year. Collectively, our results support Jensen's [Jensen, M.C. Agency costs of overvalued equity. Financial Management 2005;34; 5–19.] argument that substantial overvaluation of equity pressures managers to manipulate earnings and when investors learn about earnings restatements by overvalued firms, they reevaluate firms to correct not only for pre-misstatement overvaluation, but also for the loss of confidence in the firms' managers.

Exchangeable debt is convertible into the common stock of a target firm in which the issuing firm has an ownership position. It signifies a potential change in the issuing firm's asset composition through the divestiture of the ownership stake in the target firm. We find that announcements of exchangeable debt offers are associated with insignificant abnormal returns for the shareholders of issuing firms. The target firm's share price declines, however, when an exchangeable debt offer is announced. This result is consistent with the offer's potential to reduce the ownership concentration of the target firm's common stock.