The purpose of this paper is to emphasize the importance of selecting the efficiency evaluation model that best represents the known and postulated relation between inputs and outputs. By ignoring the input/output relationship, Mehrez, Brown, and Khouja (MBK) misspecify the efficiency evaluation model and misinterpret the distortions resulting from their misspecification as being paradoxical. This paper shows that the use of the appropriate data envelopment analysis (DEA) model reflecting the matched output/input (MOI) technology postulated by MBK will always provide efficiency estimates that satisfy their MOI axiom. Statistical consistency of the DEA estimator also implies that even with MBK's use of a misspecified model, the frequency of violation of their MOI axiom is likely to be small for large samples. Résumé. L'auteur insiste sur l'importance du choix du modèle de l'évaluation du rendement qui représente le mieux la relation connue et postulée entre les intrants et les extrants. En ignorant la relation intrant‐extrant, Mehrez, Brown et Khouja (MBK) définissent mal le modèle d'évaluation du rendement et jugent, à tort, les distorsions résultant de cette définition comme étant paradoxales. L'auteur démontre que le recours à l'analyse intégrale appropriée des données s'inspirant de la technologie de concordance extrant‐intrant postulée par MBK produit toujours des estimations du rendement qui respectent l'axiome de concordance. La cohérence statistique des estimations issues de l'analyse intégrale des données donne également à penser que même lorsqu'on utilise un modèle mal défini comme le font MBK, la fréquence des dérogations à l'axiome de concordance extrant‐intrant tend à être faible pour les gros échantillons.
[Recently, management accountants have focussed attention on the appropriate treatment of costs associated with resources committed to support activities which do not vary proportionally to production once initial capacities have been set. In one typical case, it is assumed that costs of committed resources will be incurred irrespective of actual usage, and increasing initial capacities to accommodate unexpected demand involves penalties above normal costs. There are at least two important issues that arise in such a case: (1) how should costs of resources committed to, or subsequently required by, support activities enter into pricing and capacity decisions, and (2) what information should the accounting system provide to marketing and production in order to implement those decisions. Our objective in this paper is to address these two issues. The basic tension which underlies both pricing and capacity decisions is between the nonrecoverable cost of adding capacity before demand becomes known, and the expected penalty-adjusted cost of doing so after demand becomes known. In regard to the first issue, we find in our setting that only normal cost enters into pricing rules established at the time initial capacities are set. (Penalties for exceeding initial capacities are implicit in that for the marginal unit of each activity, normal cost equals expected penalty-adjusted cost.) Findings on the second issue are that the product costing system can be designed without knowledge of demand parameters; the marketing manager only requires activity-based unit costs provided by that system, along with knowledge of demand parameters, to make pricing decisions which are optimal from a firm-wide standpoint; and the production manager only needs expected demand from marketing, along with knowledge of the distribution of random demand shocks, and cost and production parameters, to make initial capacity decisions. The economic sufficiency of the activity-based unit cost in pricing decisions is in the spirit of Amershi et al. (1989), while the equivalence of marginal cost, normal cost, and expected penalty-adjusted cost of under-capacity bear similarity to results in studies by Miller and Buckman (1987), Whang (1989) and Hansen and Magee (1993). The main distinctions between these studies and ours lie in assumptions regarding production functions, the nature of information asymmetries, and our incorporation of pricing decisions as well as capacity decisions.]
[Recent research on cost driver analysis by Miller and Vollman (1985) and Cooper and Kaplan (1987) suggests that transactions deriving from the diversity of a firm's product line and the complexity of its production process, in addition to output volume, drive overhead costs. As a consequence, it is argued, conventional cost accounting systems based only on volume-related measures, such as units of output, direct labor hours, or machine hours, produce biased and materially misleading cost estimates for managerial decisions on price and product line (whether to continue or discontinue products, or to offer additional products). Systematic biases in cost estimates may also lead to distortions in flexible budgeting systems, variance analyses, and responsibility-accounting systems. Perhaps more important in the long run, omission of operations-based cost drivers may distort the investigation of the likely effects on costs of changes in operating strategies. Many firms have moved ahead on the basis of this perceived need for more accurate cost stimates and have designed and implemented activity-based costing systems (Schiff 1991). From an academic perspective, however, there is a need for further formal empirical research in this field. Cooper and Kaplan's (1987) evidence is based on field-study discussions with managers in a variety of manufacturing settings and experimentation with cost allocation and product-costing systems based on transactions. Foster and Gupta (1990) provide some of the first empirical evidence on the correlation of manufacturing overhead with output volume and operations-based measures that reflect characteristics of the manufacturing process. Using data obtained from 37 plants of a single manufacturing firm, Foster and Gupta found that most of the volume-related measures of output were highly correlated with manufacturing overhead (MOH), but because only a few measures of manufacturing complexity and efficiency were highly correlated with MOH, their findings leave the impression that systems based on just volume may not significantly distort information generated for managerial decision making. In contrast, we find empirical evidence in favor of incorporating operations-based cost drivers along with measures of volume in cost driver models. We draw upon previous work in cost accounting and economics to develop analogs in the airline industry for product diversity, production run volumes, and process complexity, and propose a framework for cost driver analysis in the U.S. airline industry. Using a panel of quarterly data for 1981-1985 compiled primarily from traffic and financial statistics submitted by carriers to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and Department of Transportation (DOT), we specify and estimate a multivariate system of cost functions with multiple cost drivers for the industry during the transition following deregulation. We find both volume- and operations-based cost drivers to be statistically significant. We also demonstrate the potential managerial importance of the operations-based drivers by explaining variations in marginal costs across airlines in terms of operating strategies reflected in the cost driver values. Empirical cost driver analysis is managerially significant for the industry and period that we examine. The proportion of indirect costs is large, and identification of input consumption for specific services is difficult. During the transition following deregulation, carriers adopted a rich variety of strategies to improve productivity, reduce costs, and increase market share. These strategies directly involved both volume- and operations-based cost drivers. The analytical framework and model that we have developed on the basis of prior literature concerned with the airline industry enable us to examine the differential cost effects of some of the most important strategies adopted.]
[We present empirical evidence that prior accounting information, such as capital expenditure, retained earnings, funds from operations, and dividend history, is useful in explaining cross-sectional variations in the market response to stock dividend announcements. An important accounting issue concerns the information content of disclosures and their usefulness to the investor. We demonstrate the complementary role of previously disclosed firm-specific accounting information in the market's assessment of subsequently disclosed information. Thus, two firms declaring the same amount of stock dividend may experience predictably different market reactions to the announcement when it is conditioned by prior information about the firms. Comparable research by Kane et al. (1984) has shown that changes in earnings and dividends either corroborate or contradict prior information. A broader approach by Gonedes (1978) and Antle et al. (1991) shows that the sequence and history of information arrival are relevant in interpreting the information content of accounting signals. Ou and Penman (1989) demonstrate the role of prior accounting information in predicting earnings changes in subsequent periods, and John and Lang (1991) have shown, both theoretically and empirically, that the market uses information about prior insider trading to interpret the information content of dividend changes. Stock dividends are appropriate for an investigation of the complementary role of prior accounting information because their issuance is largely a paper transaction, and because they have been interpreted as a signal of better future prospects. Although significant positive abnormal returns usually accompany stock dividend announcements, alternative (and more credible) instruments could signal future prospects (such as an increase in cash dividends). The uncertainty about how investors interpret stock dividend distributions suggests a role for previously disclosed accounting information as a conditioning factor. A survey of managers of firms declaring stock dividends (Eisemann and Moses 1978) indicates that such distributions are intended either to conserve cash in difficult times or to express confidence in the firm, two diametrically opposed motivations. So one firm may declare stock rather than cash dividends in order to invest in more profitable ventures, and another may do so because it faces operating losses and a severe cash crunch. Absent other information, it is likely that the market will respond negatively when cash dividends are discontinued or decreased and replaced by stock dividends (Shefrin and Statman 1984). Other firm-specific accounting information, however, such as capital expenditure (which reflects new investments) and funds from operations (which reflect cash availability), may also influence investor responses when considered in conjunction with dividend history.]
[According to the December 1991 issue of the Survey of Current Business, expenditures of state and local governments account for more than 11 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product. Moody's 1991 Municipal Manual indicates that these governmental entities have an outstanding debt now approaching $800 billion, and a report by the Public Securities Association (1987) indicates that this debt grew at a compound annual rate of 12 percent from 1966 to 1986. State and local governmental activities continue to increase in magnitude, and evidently form an important part of the political and economic environment in which accounting operates. Important accountability issues distinctive to these organizations need accounting research attention. The articles by Feroz and Wilson and Deis and Giroux in this issue, which we have been invited to review, address some of these topics. The study by Feroz and Wilson can be regarded as an extension to the public sector of capital-market-based research that examines the effects of financial-accounting disclosures on security prices and returns. They hypothesize segmentation of the market for municipal obligations along national and regional lines and study the effects of differential information disclosure on borrowing costs. In the other study, Deis and Giroux utilize quality reviews that were conducted by the Texas Education Agency to evaluate and rate the audits (by public accountants) of public schools' financial reports. They test hypotheses about audit quality that were originally developed in the context of commercial firms. Both studies thus represent extensions of theories and methods used in research of private-sector accounting and auditing issues. The contributions of the two articles are discussed, and modifications that consider the unique aspects of governmental accounting are presented in sections I and II. Other possible avenues for research are discussed in section III.]
This paper analyzes a formal principal‐agents model of resource allocation and coordination in which demand for transfer pricing arises endogenously within a decentralized environment characterized by asymmetric information and divergence of preferences. It is shown that a modified Groves scheme achieves full information efficiency in a setting of the type considered by Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982) and Cohen and Loeb (1984) only if the information asymmetry is postcontract and collusion is precluded. Conditions for the optimality of a coordination mechanism that is immune to collusion are also examined. It is shown that demand for a collusion‐free marginal cost‐type transfer pricing scheme arises if the agents are risk neutral, the cost function is separable but not necessarily linear, and the information asymmetry is postcontract. Résumé. Les auteurs analysent un modèle structuré d'affectation des ressources et de coordination mandant‐mandataire, dans lequel la demande de prix de cession interne est issue, de façon endogène, d'un contexte décentralisé caractérisé par une information asymétrique et une divergence des préférences. Les auteurs démontrent qu'un schéma Groves modifié permet d'atteindre l'efficacité maximum de l'information dans un contexte semblable à celui qu'utilisent Harris, Kriebel et Raviv (1982) et Cohen et Loeb (1984), uniquement si l'asymétrie de l'information est postérieure au contrat et si la collusion est rendue impossible. Ils examinent également les conditions d'optimalité d'un mécanisme de coordination qui est à l'abri de la collusion. Les auteurs démontrent qu'il y a demande de prix de cession interne, à l'abri de la collusion, du type coût marginal si les mandataires sont neutres à l'egard du risque, si la fonction de coûts peut être isolée sans être nécessairement linéaire, et si l'asymétrie de l'information est postérieure au contrat.
In this paper we extend Varian's (1984) nonparametric production analysis to situations when the set of observed output, input, and price data is not consistent with profit maximization for at least one firm. In such cases, Varian's results imply that no production possibility set containing all observations can rationalize the observed data. We identify each firm whose performance, given the prices faced by it, may be found consistent with profit maximization relative to some production possibility set containing all observed output-input vectors. We show that the set 4' of all such firms can itself be weaklv rationalized in the sense that there exists a (closed, convex, and monotone) production possibility set that contains all the observations, and relative to which the performance of all the firms in the set 8O is consistent with profit maximization given their respective prices. By definition, firms not included in this largest set d of efficient observations unambiguously deviate from profit maximizing behavior for any production possibility set containing all observations. We follow Farrell (1957) and analyze these deviations into technical and allocative efficiency measures, considering as admissible all closed, convex, and monotone production possibility sets relative to which the performance of each firm in the set g remains consistent with profit maximization. We then describe nonparametric methods for determining the tightest upper and lower bounds on the technical, allocative, and aggregate efficiency measures evaluated relative to all such admissible production possibility sets. It is seen that the tightest upper bound on the technical efficiency measure is the same as the value computed by the nonparametric efficiency evaluation technique known as data envelopment analysis, thus establishing a link between this literature in management science/operations research and the nonparametric production analysis in economics.
Presents empirical evidence that prior accounting information such as capital expenditure, retained earnings, funds from operations and dividend history is useful in explaining cross-sectional variations in the market response to stock dividend announcements. Information content of disclosures and their usefulness to the investor.
[Management accountants are often required to construct measures of performance of individual managers by aggregating several accounting numbers (signals). We show that the same method of aggregation will rarely be used for evaluating the performance of different managers. Instead, the method of aggregation will vary with the specific preference functions of individual managers and the corresponding action choices induced by the owner. Such an optimal aggregate always exists but is not, in general, a sufficient statistic for the individual signals with respect to the agent's effort. We further show that, in most cases, using all the information in the sufficient statistic makes the principal strictly worse off. The analysis provides insights into a different statistical approach for evaluating nonsufficient aggregates based on the signal to noise ratio of the individual signals that are aggregated.]