Liquidity risk and corporate control considerations affect shareholders' willingness to invest in stocks and should thus be reflected in their prices. This paper derives the premium required by liquidity risk-averse agents who invest, respectively in non-voting and voting shares. It is shown that the liquidity risk premium depends upon the investor's risk aversion, the variance of his future consumption flow and the liquidation probability of each share type. Furthermore, liquidity risk premia depend upon the firm's capital structure decisions, the distribution and private valuation of voting rights by its shareholders.

This paper investigates the influence of Swiss firms' disclosure policy and of their financial analysts' coverage on stock price abnormal reactions to the publication of the annual reports. It first shows that, after controlling for the number of analysts, the absolute abnormal returns are significantly and positively affected by the rating measure used as a proxy of the informational quality of annual reports. It furthermore emphasises asymmetry in the relationship between stock price abnormal reactions and two informational variables, namely the quality of the firm's disclosure policy and its financial analysts' coverage. It appears that while positive abnormal returns are significantly and positively related to the rating variable, negative abnormal returns are only affected by the number of financial analysts. The inverse relationship between abnormal negative returns and the financial analysts' coverage supports the fact that competition among analysts reduces investors' adverse selection problem. Finally, the study evidences a non-linear relationship between rating and positive abnormal returns which is meaningful for the “good” and “very good type” firms and thus emphasises the signaling role played by a firm's financial disclosure policy.