According to conventional theory, insurance premiums should be informationally efficient predictors of the present value of policy claims and expenses. This paper develops an alternative theory of insurance market dynamics based on two assumptions. First, insured risks are dependent. Under this assumption, insurers′ net worth determines the market capacity since it is necessary to back the contractual promises to pay claims. Second, in raising net worth, external equity is more costly than internal equity. The theory explains the variation in premiums and insurance contracts over the "insurance cycle" and is supported by tests on postwar data. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G1, G22.

This article re‐examines the conclusion of previous studies that price dispersion is extreme in the American whole life insurance market. We take an axiomatic approach to the problem of measuring “price” dispersion in the market for the multiparameter whole life contracts, studying the distribution across contract offers of a price index which is uniquely determined by two conditions. In contrast to the accepted wisdom, we find that the derived measure of price dispersion is only 3.6% and that much of this dispersion can be accounted for by measurement error.

This article re-examines the conclusion of previous studies that price dispersion is extreme in the American whole life insurance market. We take an axiomatic approach to the problem of measuring “price” dispersion in the market for the multiparameter whole life contracts, studying the distribution across contract offers of a price index which is uniquely determined by two conditions. In contrast to the accepted wisdom, we find that the derived measure of price dispersion is only 3.6% and that much of this dispersion can be accounted for by measurement error.

Recent economic analyses of vertical restraints and integration emphasize the circumstances under which these arrangements are socially efficient. Efficiency claims have proven contentious, however, for exclusive dealing, a vertical restraint that prohibits any outlet carrying a manufacturer's product from stocking substitute brands. This paper analyzes the impact of exclusive dealing on competition and allocative efficiency. Opinions expressed on the impact of exclusive dealing range from the extreme view that it is invariably anticompetitive, to the view that it is always procompetitive. The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that in hundreds if not thousands of communities where there is a single retailer for a product,

This paper develops a theory of venture financing at the earliest stages. Ventures choose between issuing equity or a “SAFE”, which gives investors the right to a number of shares to be determined by a future equity price. Our key assumption is that between two rounds of financing the market learns information that is initially private to the entrepreneur. Higher quality types prefer a SAFE over equity for the first round of financing because under the SAFE they know that their types will be revealed to the market before the determination of the number of shares they must provide to investors. Offsetting this benefit of SAFEs is a moral-hazard (debt-overhang) cost. We find initial support for the theory in a data set of 500 financing rounds.

This paper offers a simple approach to the theory of decentralizing inventory and pricing decisions along a supply chain. We consider an upstream manufacturer selling to two outlets, which compete as differentiated duopolists and face uncertain demand. Demand spillovers between the outlets arise in the event of stockouts. The price mechanism, in which each outlet pays a two-part price and chooses price and inventory, virtually never coordinates incentives efficiently. Contracts that can elicit first-best decisions include resale price floors or buy-back policies (retailer-held options to sell inventory back to the manufacturers).