Agency problems within the firm are a significant hindrance to efficiency. We propose trust between coworkers as a superior alternative to the standard tools used to mitigate agency problems: increased monitoring and incentive-based pay. We model trust as mutual, reciprocal altruism between pairs of coworkers and show how it induces employees to work harder, relative to those at firms that use the standard tools. In addition, we show that employees at trusting firms have higher job satisfaction, and that these firms enjoy lower labor cost and higher profits. We conclude by discussing how trust may also be easier to use within the firm than the standard agency-mitigation tools.

In September 1999, the University of Notre Dame hosted a conference entitled “Measuring and Managing Ethical Risk: How Investing in Ethics Adds Value”. The motivations for hosting the conference and the papers presented there are summarized. Several themes that are present in the papers are discussed. These include the gains from combining the anthropological approach to business ethics with the neoclassical economics approach, the central role of trust in business ethics, the role of ethics in the corporation, and the function of the legal system in setting and enforcing ethical standards for the financial system.