To make high-quality research more accessible and easier to explore.

Fields:
4 results ✕ Clear filters

Dividend capture in NASDAQ stocks

Journal of Financial Economics 1990 28(1-2), 39-65
We examine the importance of dividend-capture trading in NASDAQ stocks by testing for cross-sectional relations between ex-day abnormal returns and bid-ask spreads. Throughout, we find that ex-day returns and spreads are positively related. The relation increases across dividend-yield quintiles and is strongest in high-yield stocks. The relation does not appear in a sample of non-ex-dividend days. These findings indicate that dividend-capture trading affects the ex-day returns of at least some, particularly high-yield, NASDAQ stocks, and that dividend-capture trading is important for understanding ex-dividend-day returns.

The Distribution of Target Ownership and the Division of Gains in Successful Takeovers.

Journal of Finance 1990 45(3), 817-33
This paper presents evidence that the distribution of target ownership is related to the division of the takeover gain between the target and the bidder for a sample of successful tender offers. In the whole sample, the target's gain is negatively related to bidder and institutional ownership. In the sample of multiple-bidder contests, the target's gain increases with managerial ownership and falls with institutional ownership.

The Distribution of Target Ownership and the Division of Gains in Successful Takeovers

Journal of Finance 1990 45(3), 817
This paper presents evidence that the distribution of target ownership is related to the division of the takeover gain between the target and the bidder for a sample of successful tender offers. In the whole sample, the target's gain is negatively related to bidder and institutional ownership. In the sample of multiple-bidder contests, the target's gain increases with managerial ownership and falls with institutional ownership.

The Distribution of Target Ownership and the Division of Gains in Successful Takeovers

Journal of Finance 1990 45(3), 817-833
This paper presents evidence that the distribution of target ownership is related to the division of the takeover gain between the target and the bidder for a sample of successful tender offers. In the whole sample, the target's gain is negatively related to bidder and institutional ownership. In the sample of multiple‐bidder contests, the target's gain increases with managerial ownership and falls with institutional ownership.