This study finds that credit default swap (CDS) trading positively affects a firm's environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance. This effect is more prominent in ESG strengths than ESG concerns. The proposed empirical connection remains valid across endogeneity-controlling methodologies, model specifications, and ESG performance measures. The effect is stronger for firms with stronger bank relationships, higher debt dependence, and more restrictive covenants. Furthermore, improvement in ESG performance is more pronounced for firms with more free cash flow, lower institutional ownership, and higher financial constraints. Our findings reveal the real effects of CDS trading on firm ESG performance.

We examine the effect of voluntary climate risk disclosure on Credit Default Swap (CDS) premiums. We develop a structural model, in which climate-related disclosures serve as an information source reducing climate change uncertainty. The model predicts a negative relation between the informativeness of climate risk disclosure and the CDS premium, and asymmetric effects of positive and negative disclosure tone on the CDS premium. Using climate risk measures quantified from earnings call transcripts, we provide evidence supporting these predictions with causal inference. Our study suggests that climate risk is priced in the CDS market, where investors pay attention to climate risk disclosures.

The salience theory of choice under risk shows that investor behavior drives cross-sectional cryptocurrency returns. Investors place too much weight on salient payouts, causing overvaluation of cryptocurrencies with upward salience returns and undervaluation of those with downward salience returns, leading to negative expected returns for the former and positive expected returns for the latter. The salience effect in the cryptocurrency market is more pronounced than in equity markets, making it a significant risk factor for explaining other cross-sectional returns in the cryptocurrency market. Unlike other documented return predictors, the salience theory uniquely contributes to understanding the cryptocurrency market.

This study examines the effects of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance on bond return volatility. After controlling for bond characteristics and firm fundamentals, we find a robust positive relationship between ESG performance and bond return volatility. The empirical results demonstrate that the impact on bond return volatility is primarily driven by ESG strengths rather than concerns. The results are robust to alternative measures, sample periods, and endogeneity controls. Furthermore, the effect of ESG performance is more pronounced for firms with opportunistic managers and poor information environments.

There have been 128 defaults among U.S. CDS reference entities between 2001 and 2020. Within this sample, the five-year CDS spread is a significant predictor of corporate default in models with equity market covariates and firm attributes. This finding holds for forecast horizons up to 12 months, among financial and non-financial firms, within and without the great financial crisis, and is robust to the inclusion of corporate bond and equity options market information. A decomposition of the CDS spread into liquidity, physical default, and risk premium components shows that most of its predictive power for corporate default comes from the physical default component, both in- and out-of-sample. These results confirm the relevance of information contained in single-name CDS pricing to corporate default prediction.

We examine takeover auctions when an informed bidder has better information about the target value than a rival and target shareholders. The informed bidder's information is either hard or soft, and only hard information can be credibly disclosed. We show that withholding information creates a winner's curse, thereby serving as a preemption device that deters the rival's participation. In turn, an endogenous disclosure cost arises that induces the informed bidder to optimally withhold favorable information to minimize the acquisition price—breaking down the standard unraveling result, even if his information is always hard. Perhaps surprisingly, stronger competition from the uninformed bidder can reduce the target shareholders' payoff and increase the payoff of the informed bidder while unambiguously improving social welfare. Moreover, “hardened” information can reduce the gains to trade, decreasing welfare, but increasing shareholders' payoff. Our results provide a cautionary note to promoting more competition and more disclosure.