In this paper a model is developed that explains the allocation of an individual's time among work and two types of leisure activities: time spent with spouse, and time spent with paramour. Data from two recent magazine surveys are available that can be used to test the predictions of the model regarding the determinants of time spent with paramour. The results of estimating the equation explaining time spent with paramour, by the Tobit estimator, are generally supportive of the model, although more evidence is needed before any definitive conclusions can be drawn. The model can also be applied to the allocation of time among other types of leisure activities.
The purpose of this paper is to examine within the context of a patieular U.S. exammetric model the sensitivity of fiscal policy effects to alternative assumptions about the behavior of the Federal Reserve. Five cases are considered, four in which Fed behavior is exogenous and one in which Fed behavior is endogenous. In each of the four exogenous cases the Fed is assumed to control a particular variable, which is then taken to be exogenous for purposes of the fiscal-policy experiments. For the endogetmus case an estimated equation explaining Fed behavior is added to the model. and the expanded mcdel is used to perform the experiments. The rewlts of some optimal control experiments are also reported in this paper. These latter experiments are designed to examine the sensitivity of optimal fiscal policies to alternative assumptions about Fed behavior. The main conclusion of this paper is that fiscal policy effects and optimal fiscal policies are quite sensitive to assumptions about the behavior of the Fed. 1. IN-cROD”cTION MOST EXAMINATIONS OF FISCAL POLICY EFFECTS in U.S. econometric models are based on the assumption that the behavior of the Federal Reserve (henceforth called the “Fed”) is exogenous, i.e., that the behavior of the Fed is not influenced by the state of the economy. The typical procedure is to assume that the Feds has control over a particular variable in the model and then to take this variable as exogenous for purposes of the fiscal policy experiments. An alternative procedure, if one believes that the behavior of the Fed is not exogenous, is to estimate an equation explaining Fed behavior (i.e., explaining the variable that the Fed is assumed to control), add this equation to the model, and use this expanded model to perform the fiscal policy experiments. The purpose of this paper is to examine within the context of a particular U.S. econometric model the sensitivity of fiscal policy effects to alternative assumptions about Fed behavior. Five cases are considered, four in which Fed behavior is exogenous and one in which Fed behavior is endogenous. In each of the four exogenous cases the Fed is assumed to control a particular variable, which is then taken to be exogenous for purposes of the fiscal policy experiments. The control variables in the four cases are: (1) the amount of government securities outstanding; (2) the money supply; (3) nonborrowed reserves; and (4) the bill rate. For the endogenous case an estimated equation explaining Fed behavior is added to the model, and the expanded model is used to perform the fiscal policy experiments. Section 2 contains a brief description of the econometric model used for purposes of this paper. The model, which is described in detail in Fair [9], is particularly suited for examining the effects of monetary and fiscal policies ‘The research described in this paper was financed by grant SOC77-03274 from the National
The Review of Economics and Statistics197860(2), 159
InttwIttctionN important question in political economy A.' ts how, if at all, economic events affect voting behavior.Although there is by now a fairly large literature devoted to this question,' there is no widely agreed upon answer.Kramer (1971), for example, concluded from his analysis of U.S. voting behavior that economic fluctuations have an important influence on congressional elections, whereas Stigler (1973) concluded that they do not.This debate'has been continued by Arcelus and Meltzer (1975a, b), Bloom and Price (1975), and Goodman and Kramer (1975)?Many of the disagreements in this area are over statistical procedures and the interpretation of empirical results, but it is also clear that there is no single theory of voting behavior to which everyone subscribes.Unfortunately, the distinction between theoretical and empirical disagreements in this literature is often not very sharp, and there has been no systematic testing of one theory against another.This paper has two main purposes.The first is to present a model of voting behavior that is general enough to incorporate what appear to be most of the theories of voting behavior in the recent literature and that allows one to test
In this paper a model is developed that explains the allocation of an individual's time among work and two types of leisure activities: time spent with spouse, and time spent with paramour. Data from two recent magazine surveys are available that can be used to test the predictions of the model regarding the determinants of time spent with paramour. The results of estimating the equation explaining time spent with paramour, by the Tobit estimator, are generally supportive of the model, although more evidence is needed before any definitive conclusions can be drawn. The model can also be applied to the allocation of time among other types of leisure activities.