The purpose of this paper is to generalize the Farrell indexes of productive efficiency to nonhomothetic production technologies, and at the same time maintain the cost interpretation of the Farrell measures. Since the generalized indexes rely heavily on recent developments in the estimation of frontier cost and production functions, several frontier models are reviewed. In addition to generalized indexes of technical, allocative, and overall productive efficiency, a variety of single-factor efficiency measures are discussed. The applicability of the proposed efficiency measures is illustrated with a numerical example of electric power generation.

The use of cost-benefit analysis by federal regulatory agencies has expanded greatly in scope and sophistication. Unfortunately, agencies continue to employ private cost rather than social cost to evaluate environmental quality regulations. Furthermore, general equilibrium impacts and intertemporal effects of regulations are typically not included in the evaluation. In this paper we estimate the social cost of environmental quality regulations mandated by the Clean Air and Clean Water acts. We construct an econometric general equilibrium model of the United States to demonstrate that social cost estimates diverge sharply from private cost estimates. We also demonstrate that general equilibrium impacts are significant and pervasive and that intertemporal effects of the regulations, heretofore ignored, are significant.

The use of cost-benefit analysis by federal regulatory agencies has expanded greatly in scope and sophistication. Unfortunately, agencies continue to employ private cost rather than social cost to evaluate environmental quality regulations. Furthermore, general equilibrium impacts and intertemporal effects of regulations are typically not included in the evaluation. In this paper we estimate the social cost of environmental quality regulations mandated by the Clean Air and Clean Water acts. We construct an econometric general equilibrium model of the United States to demonstrate that social cost estimates diverge sharply from private cost estimates. We also demonstrate that general equilibrium impacts are significant and pervasive and that intertemporal effects of the regulations, heretofore ignored, are significant.

This paper considers the effects for offering a “would-not-vote” option in contingent valuation (CV) questions framed using the referendum format. This approach arises from a suggestion made by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) panel on contingent valuation. The NOAA panel was asked to evaluate the use of this method for estimating the economic value of nonmarketed environmental resources in the context of natural resource damage assessments. This test used the CV questionnaire developed for the study of the Exxon Valdez oil spill conducted by the State of Alaska with in-person interviews. The findings suggest that when those selecting the “would-not-vote” response are treated as having voted “against” the program (a conservative coding), offering this option does not alter (1) the distribution of “for” and “against” responses (2) the estimates of willingness to pay derived from these choices, or (3) the construct validity of the results.

This paper considers the effects for offering a “would-not-vote” option in contingent valuation (CV) questions framed using the referendum format. This approach arises from a suggestion made by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) panel on contingent valuation. The NOAA panel was asked to evaluate the use of this method for estimating the economic value of nonmarketed environmental resources in the context of natural resource damage assessments. This test used the CV questionnaire developed for the study of the Exxon Valdez oil spill conducted by the State of Alaska with in-person interviews. The findings suggest that when those selecting the “would-not-vote” response are treated as having voted “against” the program (a conservative coding), offering this option does not alter (1) the distribution of “for” and “against” responses (2) the estimates of willingness to pay derived from these choices, or (3) the construct validity of the results.