We exploit the change in U.S. segment reporting rules (from SFAS No. 14 to SFAS No. 131) to examine two motives for managers to conceal segment profits: proprietary costs and agency costs. Managers face proprietary costs of segment disclosure if the revelation of a segment that earns high abnormal profits attracts more competition and, hence, reduces the abnormal profits. Managers face agency costs of segment disclosure if the revelation of a segment that earns low abnormal profits reveals unresolved agency problems and, hence, leads to heightened external monitoring. By comparing a hand-collected sample of restated SFAS No. 131 segments with historical SFAS No. 14 segments, we examine at the segment level whether managers' disclosure decisions are influenced by their proprietary and agency cost motives to conceal segment profits. Specifically, we test two hypotheses: (1) when the proprietary cost motive dominates, managers tend to withhold the segments with relatively high abnormal profits (hereafter, the proprietary cost motive hypothesis), and (2) when the agency cost motive dominates, managers tend to withhold the segments with relatively low abnormal profits (hereafter, the agency cost motive hypothesis). Our results are consistent with the agency cost motive hypothesis, whereas we find mixed evidence with regard to the proprietary cost motive hypothesis.

We compare the value and credit relevance of financial statements under fair-value and smoothing (SFAS-87) models of pension accounting. While fair-value improves the credit relevance of the balance sheet, it does not improve its value relevance. Further, fair-value impairs both the value and credit relevance of the income statement and the combined financial statements unless transitory gains and losses (G&L) are separated from more persistent income components. Overall, our results suggest there are no informational benefits to adopting a fair-value pension accounting model.

We examine three‐day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of 702 newly appointed outside directors assigned to audit committees during a period before implementation of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX). Motivated by the SOX requirement that public companies disclose whether they have a financial expert on their audit committee, we test whether the market reacts favorably to the appointment of directors with financial expertise to the audit committee. In addition, because it is controversial whether SOX should define financial experts narrowly to include primarily accounting financial experts (as initially proposed) or more broadly to include nonaccounting financial experts (as ultimately passed), we separately examine appointments of each type of expert. We find a positive market reaction to the appointment of accounting financial experts assigned to audit committees but no reaction to nonaccounting financial experts assigned to audit committees, consistent with accounting‐based financial skills, but not broader financial skills, improving the audit committee's ability to ensure high‐quality financial reporting. In addition, we find that this positive reaction is concentrated among firms with relatively strong corporate governance, consistent with accounting financial expertise complementing strong governance, possibly because strong governance helps channel the expertise toward enhancing shareholder value. Together, these findings are consistent with financial expertise on audit committees improving corporate governance but only when both the expert and the appointing firm possess characteristics that facilitate the effective use of the expertise.

We examine whether organizational form matters for a firm's cost of capital. Contrary to the conventional view, we argue that coinsurance among a firm's business units can reduce systematic risk through the avoidance of countercyclical deadweight costs. We find that diversified firms have, on average, a lower cost of capital than comparable portfolios of stand‐alone firms. In addition, diversified firms with less correlated segment cash flows have a lower cost of capital, consistent with a coinsurance effect. Holding cash flows constant, our estimates imply an average value gain of approximately 5% when moving from the highest to the lowest cash flow correlation quintile.

This paper examines whether the negative association between aggregate earnings and returns is explained by the monetary policy news in aggregate earnings. Using Federal funds futures data to construct a measure of policy news, we find that aggregate earnings convey information about the Fed׳s policy actions. Additionally, the negative aggregate earnings-returns association is muted when we control for policy surprises. This result is more pronounced in periods with negative policy surprises, which tend to trigger a more significant market reaction. Taken together, these results suggest that aggregate earnings convey policy news and the market reacts negatively to policy surprises, which drives the negative aggregate earnings-returns association.

We functionally derive the discretionary component of the pension obligation (PBO) based on deviation of actuarial assumptions—discount rate and compensation growth rate—from their respective industry medians. We then examine the implications of allowing discretion in the choice of pension assumptions on the pricing of the PBO. We find no evidence that discretion—as currently allowed under U.S. GAAP—impairs the value relevance of the PBO. We also find that the discretionary component is incrementally value-relevant beyond the nondiscretionary component. Additional analyses suggest that these results are unlikely attributable to market fixation on reported PBO or measurement error in our discretionary component. Overall, we find that imposing uniformity in the choice of pension assumptions, on average, prevents communication of value-relevant information through the PBO.

We examine the macroeconomic information content of aggregate earnings from the labor market's perspective. We use insights from the labor economics literature to characterize the information contained in aggregate GAAP earnings and its components that is relevant for predicting aggregate job creation and destruction. Our results suggest that not only does aggregate earnings news convey information about future labor market aggregates, but its information content is incremental to other macroeconomic variables at near-term horizons. Further, the source of this information stems primarily from two earnings components: aggregate core earnings and special items. Shocks to core earnings signal persistent changes in economy-wide profitability that predict aggregate job creation up to four quarters ahead, while shocks to special items predict job destruction up to one quarter. Taken together, our results suggest that aggregate earnings contain useful information about future labor market conditions, with the nature of such information varying across earnings components.