The paper investigates the portfolio allocation effects of increased asset co-movements during market downturns. We develop a model for the stock price process that allows for increased and asymmetric dependence between extreme return realizations. We isolate the portfolio hedging demands that arise due to extreme co-movements and find a substantial shift of the portfolio holdings toward the risk-free asset. We demonstrate that accounting for dependence between extreme events in portfolio decisions leads to significant economic gains that stem primarily from intertemporal hedging motives. These findings are robust along alternative modeling assumptions of extreme co-movements and conditional correlation.

A closet indexer is more likely to meet a value-weighted investment benchmark by value weighting the portfolio. Following this intuition, we introduce a simple measure of active management, the absolute difference between the value weights and actual weights held by a fund, summed across its holdings. This proxy captures managerial skill: active funds outperform passive ones by 2.5% annually. Compared with known measures of skill, our proxy robustly predicts fund flows, asset growth, factor-adjusted performance, and value added. Its predictive ability is orthogonal to that of other measures and is robust to controlling for volatility timing, past performance, and style.

The paper investigates the portfolio allocation effects of increased asset co-movements during market downturns. We develop a model for the stock price process that allows for increased and asymmetric dependence between extreme return realizations. We isolate the portfolio hedging demands that arise due to extreme co-movements and find a substantial shift of the portfolio holdings toward the risk-free asset. We demonstrate that accounting for dependence between extreme events in portfolio decisions leads to significant economic gains that stem primarily from intertemporal hedging motives. These findings are robust along alternative modeling assumptions of extreme co-movements and conditional correlation.

Financial relationships can alleviate the adverse effects of asymmetric information and agency costs on outside stakeholders. We examine announcement returns to PIPE transactions, conditional on the contract terms and identity of the investor. We find that the influence of contract terms on announcement returns depends on investor identity. For PIPEs with hedge fund investors, the inclusion of control terms associates with much larger announcement returns. In contrast, announcement returns for PIPEs, involving strategic investors, are less dependent on the existence of control terms. We find the opposite for liquidity terms. Namely, announcement returns are dramatically different for strategic investors with and without liquidity terms, while inclusion of liquidity terms is less influential when PIPEs involve hedge funds. Our findings suggest that investor identity and contract terms jointly influence market reactions to PIPEs.