We investigate the extent to which managerial incentives, including golden parachute (GP) payments, have influenced target acquisition gains over the past two decades. We find that the use and scope of GP contracts expanded dramatically for a large sample of firms acquired from 1980 through 1995. To investigate the effect of managerial incentives on target acquisition gains, we estimate a regression of abnormal stock returns for acquisitions on variables including managerial incentives, the value of GP payments, and the interaction between GPs and management incentives. The regression results indicate that management incentives are positively associated with target acquisition returns and that GP payments serve to mitigate this influence. We do not, however, detect any direct association between the level of GP payments and target gains.

We examine the interaction between internal control assessments and substantive testing in a model of fraud detection. The purpose of our study is to examine a two‐stage model of the auditor‐manager interaction in which the auditor assesses the “likelihood” or possibility of fraud in the first stage and conducts substantive tests in the second stage. We examine the allocation of audit resources across these two distinct facets of the audit. We find that, regardless of the auditor's allocation, the probability of undetected fraud remains the same, but the allocation of some audit resources to internal control assessment may provide cost savings for the auditor.