The authors' examination of the cross-section of expected returns reveals economically and statistically significant compensation (about 6 to 9 percent per annum) for beta risk when betas are estimated from time-series regressions of annual portfolio returns on the annual return on the equally weighted market index. The relation between book-to-market equity and returns is weaker and less consistent than that in Fama and French (1992). The authors conjecture that past book-to-market results using COMPUSTAT data are affected by a selection bias and provide indirect evidence.

[This paper evaluates alternative accrual-based models for detecting earnings management. The evaluation compares the specification and power of commonly used test statistics across the measures of discretionary accruals generated by the models and provides the following major insights. First, all of the models appear well specified when applied to a random sample of firm-years. Second, the models all generate tests of low power for earnings management of economically plausible magnitudes (e.g., one to five percent of total assets). Third, all models reject the null hypothesis of no earnings management at rates exceeding the specified test-levels when applied to samples of firms with extreme financial performance. This result highlights the importance of controlling for financial performance when investigating earnings management stimuli that are correlated with financial performance. Finally, a modified version of the model developed by Jones (1991) exhibits the most power in detecting earnings management.]

Using confidential data of executive-specific short-term bonus plans, we investigate the extent to which executives manipulate earnings to maximize the present value of bonus plan payments. As such, this paper extends the work of Healy (1985). Like Healy, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that managers manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum. Unlike Healy, we find no evidence that managers manipulate earnings downwards when earnings are below the minimum necessary to receive any bonus. We demonstrate that Healy's results at the lower bound are likely to be induced by his methodology.

We examine whether the structure of compensation for the divisional CEO is related to subsequent innovative activity within the division, and whether the divisional CEO's compensation is structured as a function of the expected innovation opportunity set facing the division. Both the expected innovation opportunity set and the divisional executive's compensation contract are treated as endogenous variables by adopting a simultaneous equation approach. We find modest evidence that the proportion of total compensation tied to long-term components has a positive relation with future innovation, but no evidence that this proportion has a positive relation with the expected innovation opportunity set.

Evaluates alternative accrual-based models for detecting earnings management. Comparison of the specification and power of commonly used test statistics; Application of the models to a random sample of firm-years; Importance of controlling for financial performance when investigating earnings management stimuli that are correlated with financial performance.

Our examination of the cross‐section of expected returns reveals economically and statistically significant compensation (about 6 to 9 percent per annum) for beta risk when betas are estimated from time‐series regressions of annual portfolio returns on the annual return on the equally weighted market index. The relation between book‐to‐market equity and returns is weaker and less consistent than that in Fama and French (1992). We conjecture that past book‐to‐market results using COMPUS‐TAT data are affected by a selection bias and provide indirect evidence.

Our examination of the cross-section of expected returns reveals economically and statistically significant compensation (about 6 to 9% per annum) for beta risk when betas are estimated from time-series regressions of annual portfolio returns on the annual return on the equal-weighted market index. The relation between book-to-market equity and returns is weaker than that in Fama and French (1992a). We conjecture that book-to-market results using COMPUSTAT data are affected by a selection bias and provide indirect evidence.