This paper documents the effects of large (block) transactions on the prices of common stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange. We examine whether mean temporary and permanent price effects associated with large and small transactions differ and whether the price effects vary cross-sectionally according to the size of the block. Alternative definitions of block size are investigated – percentage of the equity traded, block volume in relation to normal trading volume, and dollar value of the block. The results suggest that price effects are predominantly temporary for seller-initiated transactions and permanent for buyer-initiated transactions.

[This paper investigates the extent to which models based on financial and market variables predict auditors' decisions to issue qualified audit reports in situations involving contingencies or uncertainties. A probit model is developed with the dependent variable indicating whether the firm received a qualified opinion, and the independent variables representing publicly available financial and market variables. The estimated model distinguishes between unqualified (clean) opinions and first-time qualifications and between types of qualifications (e.g., going concern, litigation, asset realizing, and multiple qualifications) in the year of the qualification, for both an estimation sample and a holdout sample. The predictive accuracy of the estimated model is evaluated in terms of misclassification costs for alternative costs of type I and type II errors and for specific prior probabilities of qualified and clean opinions.]

This paper investigates the extent to which models based on financial and market variables predict auditors' decisions to issue qualified audit reports in situations involving contingencies or uncertainties. A probit model is developed with the dependent variable indicating whether the firm received a qualified opinion, and the independent variables representing publicly available financial and market variables. The estimated model distinguishes between unqualified (clean) opinions and first-time qualifications and between types of qualifications (e.g., going concern, litigation, asset realizing, and multiple qualifications) in the year of the qualification, for both an estimation sample and a holdout sample. The predictive accuracy of the estimated model is evaluated in terms of misclassification costs for alternative costs of type I and type II errors and for specific prior probabilities of qualified and clean opinions.